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INTRODUCTION
In most cases the parties meet their obligations in accordance with the
contract or treaty. Nevertheless, it happens that one party fails to meet his
obligations. In the context of contract law, for instance, a seller might fail
to deliver the goods; delay in delivering the goods; or deliver non-
conforming goods. In the context of investment law, a state might fail to
live up to its treaty obligations to not discriminate against a foreign
investor. Or, it might fail to honor its contractual obligations under an
investment contract. In all these cases one party breaches its obligations
by not following its obligations under the contract or the treaty.
To tackle the consequences of such a breach, contract law has
remedies in place to protect an aggrieved party. In a general
classification, these remedies may be divided into three categories:
2 [Vol. 28
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specific,' substitutionary,2 and termination.3 Specific performance refers
to demanding "actual performance of the defaulting party's
undertaking." Further, substitutionary relief is concerned with
"compensation for not having received the promised performance."5 In a
simple word, termination means putting an end to the life of a contract.
The goal behind all these remedies is to put the aggrieved party in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been fully
performed.6 However, the approaches taken to provide effective remedies
and accomplish the goal just mentioned vary from one legal system to the
next. Civil law regimes such as France, Germany, Netherland, and Iran
prefer specific reliefs over the compensatory measures.' On the other
hand, in common law systems such as the United States and England,
compensatory measures come first.8 In some other countries, remedies
have a discretionary nature.9 That is to say, an aggrieved party has a broad
discretion to choose from the available remedies.
In the context of international investment disputes, however, despite
the fact that the principle of pacta sunt servanda (Latin for "agreements
must be kept") has widely been recognized, courts and arbitral tribunals
normally award monetary compensation and rarely grant specific
performance. The main reasons put forward against the availability of
specific performance have to do with its interference with a state's
1. In the literature, specific performance is recognized also as a primary or preventive
relief Ewan McKendrick & lain Maxwell, Specific Performance in International Arbitration, I
CHINESE J. COMP. L. 195, 196 (2013), http://cjcl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/195.full.
pdf+html.
2. Pecuniary, compensatory, and secondary remedies are interchangeable with
substitutionary remedies. JANET ANNE O'SULLIVAN & JONATHAN HILLIARD, THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 436 (5th ed. 2012).
3. G.H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT 3
(1998).
4. Id at 1.
5. Id
6. Liu CHENGWEi, REMEDIES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM CISG,
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES & PECL 33 (2003); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance.
89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979).
7. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (PARTS I & II) 363 nn.1-4 (Ole Lando &
Hugh Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter Lando & Beale]; see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED STATES CONVENTION 296-98 (3d ed. 2009);
Ebrahim Shoarian & Farshad Rahimi, International Sales Law from the Perspective of Doctrine
and Case Law 378 (Shahre-e-Danesh Institute of Law, Tehran 2015) (translation is in Persian).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, ch. 7 (1994); U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, arts. 45 & 61 (1981); STEFAN
VOGENAUER & JAN KLEINHEISTERKAMP, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) 728 (2009); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER:
COMMENTARY ON THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 694
(Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d. ed. 2010) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER].
3
Dizgovin: Foundations of Specific Performance in Investor-State Dispute Set
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
sovereignty,"0 difficulty in its enforcement," and the fact that investors
in the vast majority of cases frame their claims in terms of monetary
compensation. The main thesis of this Article is that courts and arbitral
tribunals should be able to grant specific performance in international
investment disputes for five main reasons.
Firstly, granting specific performance does not conflict with a state's
sovereignty since the right and power of a state to enter into a contract or
undertake obligations in the treaty is an obvious attribute of
sovereignty. 12
Secondly, as modem law of contract demonstrates, an immediate
effect of the principle of pacta sunt servanda is the other party's right to
opt for performance.
Thirdly, there are situations where neither granting specific
performance nor awarding damages independently could make whole all
of the losses arising from a breach of a contract; rather, a combination of
specific performance and monetary relief (and sometimes a shift from
one remedy to another remedy) could fully compensate the aggrieved
party.
Fourthly, in the context of both commercial and investment contracts,
there are situations in which only specific performance might make whole
all losses arising from a breach of an obligation. For instance, in the
context of "debt-for-nature swap"13 investment, monetary compensation
will be an inadequate remedy since "debt-for-nature swaps are non-
pecuniary: the NGO [non-governmental organization] invests in the host
country's environment, with no expectation of financial return."14 The
non-pecuniary nature of debt-for-nature swaps investment makes
10. Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law
and National State Liability: A Functional and Comparative View, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW & COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 747 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); LG&E
Energy Corp et al. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 02/1, Award, ¶¶ 84-87 (July 25,
2007).
11. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 280 (2000).
12. Lowell C. Wadmond, The Sanctity of Contract Between a Sovereign and a Foreign
National, 1957 A.B.A. SEC. MINERAL & NAT. RES. L. PROC. 179 (1957); see generally Libyan
Am. Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, Apr. 12, 1977, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981); BP
Exploration Co. (Libya), Ltd. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979); Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, Jan. 19,
1977, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978). Analysis of these cases can be seen in Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt
Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth
and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1550, 1583-93 (2009).
13. Debt-for-nature swap investments involves "an exchange or cancellation of a foreign
country's debt in return for the debtor country's commitment to use a given amount of local
currency funds to protect national parks, establish environmental education programs or train
people in natural resource conservation or management." Rosanne Model, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: Environmental Investments Using Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for
Expropriation, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1991).
14. Id at 1198.
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compensation an inadequate remedy in the event of host country
expropriation.1 5  This kind of investment aims at preventing or
diminishing "destructive effects of the economy and poor agricultural
management" on the environment.16 In order to impede these negative
measures, "the NGO obtains a commitment from the debtor-country
government to protect an endangered habitat or to train people in natural
resources conservation and sustainable development."'7 If the host state
fails to meet its commitments, it is clear that monetary compensation will
not be the appropriate remedy since the only motivation for debt-for-
nature swaps is to get the host state to engage in activities that guarantee
the protection of environment or to prevent it to take any action that has
a destructive effect on the environment.
Fifthly, the problem inherent in the enforcement of specific
performance in investment disputes is a procedural dilemma and should
not have any effect on the existence of a substantive right to require
performance; enforcement is another issue that requires its own
solutions.'8 To put it differently, the claim that enforcement of specific
performance in investment disputes is tough is absolutely plausible and
convincing, since "a judgment ordering the debtor to perform is not of
much use to the creditor unless the legal system provides the means to
make it effective."'9 The solution should not, however, be simply
rejecting specific performance in international investment disputes. If
there is no theoretical problem to award specific performance in Investor-
State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) and there are situations in which it is
inevitable or desirable to grant specific performance, one needs to come
up with solutions to address the enforcement problem rather than
attacking it for being an unenforceable remedy.20
It is clear that this Article cannot address all of the reasons mentioned
to support the availability of specific performance in ISDS, nor can it
thoroughly address the relationship of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda with other general principles. The Article will mainly deal with
the principle of pacta sunt servanda nd doctrines of "change of remedy"
and "accumulation of remedies" to support the theoretical foundations of
specific performance and its inevitability and desirability in ISDS.
15. Id at 1199-1200.
16. Id. at 1196.
17. Id. at 1197.
18. See Michael E. Schneider, Non-Monetary Relief in International Arbitration:
Principles and Arbitration Practice, in PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY RELIEF IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: ASA SPECIAL SERIES No. 305 (Michael E. Schneider & Joachim
Knoll eds., JurisNet 2011) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY]; David Ramos Mufioz, The
Power ofArbitrators to Make Pro-Futuro Orders, in id. at 117.
19. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 473 (3d ed.
1998).
20. See Schneider, in PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY, supra note 18, at 5.
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However, this Article does not submit that specific performance
should be available in all circumstances. There are, of course, situations
where granting specific performance is not possible, efficient, or
desirable. For instance, "restitution will be materially impossible in
situations such as where the subject-matter of the dispute has been
destroyed, has irremediably deteriorated (for example when a confiscated
ship has been sunk), has perished or where it has passed into the hands of
a bona fide third party."21 In any event, however, the principle of pacta
sunt servanda ought to be a starting point for the analysis of available
remedies to an aggrieved party.
This Article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part I is
about remedies in general. Here, the Article gives a brief overview of
remedies in contract law and then turns to address forms of reparation in
international law. It also examines the state of investment law with regard
to the remedy of specific performance in the light of treaties and case law.
In the Part dealing with case law, the main focus will be on the cases that
have addressed specific performance. Part I also discusses the remedy of
specific performance under the Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (PICC) and how it is relevant for settling investor-state dispute
settlement. It thus concludes with providing a definition of specific
performance and different types of it.
Part II starts with addressing the principle of pacta sunt servanda
under the PICC. It argues that under the PICC an aggrieved party's right
to choose specific performance is a general principle that is the direct
effect of breach of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. It then examines
the state of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in international
investment law. It establishes that the principle of pacta sunt servanda
lies at the heart of international law as well as international investment
law and maintains that it should be taken seriously especially where the
host state acts arbitrarily and in bad faith. It holds that an investor's right
to choose specific performance is not only the investor's natural right but
also shall promote stability and predictability in international investment
law and more importantly is compatible with the nature of long-term
contracts. Furthermore, it comes to the conclusion that the use of specific
performance in ISDS is not against states' sovereignty since the right and
power to enter into a contract or a treaty is an obvious attribute of state's
sovereignty.
. Part III is concerned with identifying circumstances under which an
order for specific performance in ISDS might prove to be indispensible
and desirable. It first examines these situations in the light of literature
and makes it clear that there are certainly situations where an order for
21. CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 571 (2008). For a real life
example of this principle, see Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB
07/16, Award T 436 (Nov. 8, 2010).
6 [Vol. 28
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specific performance in ISDS shall be inevitable and desirable such as
where the host state is unable to pay the damages or it shows willingness
to live up to its obligations specifically and there is high chance of the
continuation of friendly relationship between the investor and the host
state. It proposes two mechanisms namely the doctrines of "change of
remedy" and "accumulation of remedies" to accomplish the goal of full
compensation in ISDS through the remedy of specific performance. It
addresses the two mentioned doctrines under the PICC and international
investment law and concludes that international investment law might be
more open to these doctrines, particularly to the mechanism of change of
remedy.
I. REMEDIES IN GENERAL
A. Remedies for Breach of an Obligation in Contract Law
A breach of an obligation could take place in all legal systems and in
all types of contracts. A party to a contract or a treaty might fail to meet
its obligations arising from the contract, either investment or commercial
contract, or the treaty. A state might fail to treat a foreign investor in a
"fair and equitable" manner. A seller may not live up to its promises on
time.
To tackle the consequences of such a breach, contract law has devices
to deal with this problem. The meaning of non-performance and the scope
of remedies granted based on the definition of non-performance might
vary from one legal regime to the next, however, generally speaking, the
main remedies available include claims for damages, the right to claim
performance-recovery of money due or specific performance of non-
monetary obligations-and the right to terminate the contract.22 There are
also some incidental remedies such as suspension of performance that
might be resorted before invoking main remedies.23
The goal behind all these remedies is to put the aggrieved party in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been fully
performed ("full compensation").24 However, the approaches taken to
provide effective remedies and accomplish the goal vary from one legal
system to the next. Civil law regimes such as France, Germany,
Netherland, and Iran, prefer specific relief over the compensatory
22. TREITEL, supra note 3, at 1-2; JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG: A
COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 108 (3d. ed. 2008); VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra
note 9, at 728.
23. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 728.
24. CHENGWEi, supra note 6, at 33; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 271.
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measures.2 5 On the other hand, in common law systems such as the
United States and England, compensatory measures come first.26 In
others, remedies have a discretionary nature.27 That is to say, an
aggrieved party has a broad discretion to choose from the available
remedies.
In the context of contract law, because of a wide range of available
remedies, the purpose of full compensation is usually served. However,
in the context of investment law, the normal remedy is pecuniary
damages and courts and arbitral tribunals rarely grant specific
performance. This may give rise to inefficiencies since there are certainly
situations where pecuniary damages will not rectify an aggrieved party's
losses in investment disputes.28 The soundness of a legal regime depends
in large part on the one hand devising appropriate remedies or
mechanisms to encounter any breach of an obligation and on other hand
strong devices for the enforcement of the available remedies.2 9 Therefore,
in order to enhance the soundness of the investment law regime, one
needs to increase the availability of specific performance as another
remedy available for the aggrieved party.
B. Forms ofReparation in International Law
In accordance with the International Law Commission's Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles),
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction are the three main forms of
reparation that are devised to address the legal consequences of an
internationally wrongful act.30 We will mainly focus on restitution
because it has long been established, at least in theory, as the primary
remedy in international law. There is no consensus, however, among
scholars whether specific performance falls within the types of reparation
in the ILC Articles. In the following paragraphs, we will argue that
specific performance might be associated with the duty of restitutio in
integrum. Before that, we will briefly define compensation and
satisfaction in the ILC Articles.
According to Article 36 of the ILC Articles, compensation as a
25. Shoarian & Rahimi, supra note 7, at 372-79; HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 296-98.
26. See id.
27. See supra text accompanying note 9.
28. See Model, supra note 13, at 1198.
29. ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 115-16
(2009); Daniel Friedman, Rights and Remedies, in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract
3-4 (Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2005).
30. Article 34 of ILC Articles reads "full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction,
either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." Official
Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement no. 10 (A56/10, Ch. V, art. 34
(2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles and Commentaries].
8 [Vol. 28
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remedy "shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of
profits insofar as it is established."3 1 Under Article 31 recoverable
damages include both material and moral damages.3 2 Moral damage is,
however, recoverable in the form of satisfaction.3 3
Article 37(2) of the ILC Articles defines satisfaction as "an
acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology
or another appropriate modality."34 According to the commentary it is
intended to rectify those kinds of losses that are not assessable in financial
terms and amount to an affront to the State.3 5
When it comes to the remedy of restitution as the main focus of this
section, Article 36 of the ILC Articles defines it as reestablishing "the
situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed." The
remedy of restitution amounts to, at least in theory, a primary remedy in
international law.3 6 The primacy of restitution was established by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in its famous holding in
the case concerning the Factory at Chorzow and then codified in the ILC
Articles specially Article 34 which puts restitution first in the list of
means of reparation. One can infer the primacy of restitution from Article
36(1) of the ILC Articles as well which provides "the State responsible
for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate
for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good
by restitution."
In Chorzow, the court explained:
the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act-a principle which seems to be established by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
31. Id. art. 36.
32. Id. art. 31.
33. See id. art. 36, cmt. I (explaining that "the qualification 'financially assessable' is
intended to exclude compensation for what is sometimes referred to as 'moral damage' to a State,
i.e. the affront or injury caused by a violation of rights not associated with actual damage to
property or persons: this is the subject matter of satisfaction, dealt with in article 37").
34. Id. art. 37(2).
35. Id. art. 37, cmt. 3.
36. See Steffen Hindelang, Restitution and Compensation- Reconstructing the Relationship
in Investment Treaty Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 161 (Rainer Hoffman &
Christopher J. Tams eds., 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2525065; see BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 61 (2011) (noting that "restitution has been recognized
as the primary remedy in international law, because it has the potential to eliminate, legally and
materially, the consequences of an unlawful act").
9
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committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in
place of it-such are the principles which should serve to
determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to
international law.3 7
This award implies that "restitution is the normal form of reparation
and indemnity could only take its place if restitution in kind is not
possible."38 This award also contains the general principle of full
reparation that Article 31 of the ILC Articles has codified as the
responsible State being under the "obligation to make full reparation for
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act."3 9 Scholars have
argued that restitution is the very first and primary remedy that can "wipe
out" all consequences of a breach by the responsible state and this is why
the Chorzow case and the ILC articles consider restitution as the primary
remedy.4 0
Restitution might be divided into two categories: material and
juridical restitution.4 1 The former referring to the injury that takes the
form of material damage. Therefore an order to perform in kind would
include, for instance, the state's duty to restitute confiscated property,
release a detained individual, or restitute an arrested ship.42 The latter
consisting of cases where "implementation of restitution involves the
modification of a legal situation either within the legal system of the
author state or on the international plane."43 Accordingly, it might
require, among other things, annulling certain national laws or court
decisions or even an international treaty.44 In both cases, however,
restitution in kind is not a pure reestablishment of the status quo ante, but,
rather, under the mandate of the principle of full reparation, compensation
may supplement restitution in kind.45 By way of illustration, "a mere
restoration of an expropriated property to the aggrieved party may not
fully repair the aggrieved party's economic losses" such as diminution in
37. Cour Permanente De Justice Internationale [The Permanent Court of International
Justice], July 26, 1927, File E.C., Docket XI, Judgment No. 8, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/pcij/serie A/A 09/28_Usine deChorzow Competence Arret.pdf.
38. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 369
(1991).
39. Hindelang, supra note 36, at 2.
40. Id. at 3; SABAHI, supra note 36, at 61.
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the value of the property and moral damages.46 In these situations,
therefore, monetary compensation will supplement restitution.
There is controversy among scholars as to whether specific
performance falls within the types of reparation in the Chorzow case and
the ILC Articles.
Some have argued that restitution as a form of reparation in the ILC
Articles is distinct from specific performance.47 Having noted that
restitution has even been treated as synonymous to specific performance,
Christine D. Gray argues that "restitutio in integrum demands the re-
establishment of the situation which would in all probability have existed
if the illegal act had not been committed. That is, it does not expressly
involve an order for specific performance, and it goes further than
specific performance in that it may involve the rectification of harm
already caused by the illegal act."4 8 This argument is not without flaw
since specific performance is not usually granted alone, rather it is
accompanied with damages that is intended to rectify those part of losses
that specific performance cannot remediate in itself (accumulation of
specific performance with damages). Professor Zachary Douglas also
puts forward that "restitution should not be confused with specific
performance, the latter being confined to the enforcement of contractual
obligations."49 He does not further develop his statement. However, it
follows from this statement hat restitution encompasses the enforcement
of both contractual and non-contractual obligations. In any event, it seems
that the better view has been pronounced by Sabahi where he points out
that specific performance may be associated with the duty of restitutio in
integrum. According to him, such a categorization also derives from
Commentary 5 to the Article 35 of the ILC Articles where it provides "the
term restitution in article 35 has a broad meaning, encompassing any
action that needs to be taken by the responsible State to restore the
situation resulting from its internationally wrongful act."50 Moreover,
"investors in arbitral decisions on some occasions have sought specific
performance of the state party's obligations . .. associating this remedy
with restitution."5 1 Therefore, in our view, restitution is a broad concept
that encompasses pecific performance as well.
46. SABAHI, supra note 36, at 62.
47. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1990).
48. Id. at 12-13.
49. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 100 (2009).
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C. Specific Performance in International Investment Law
1. Treaties
In general, investment treaties, either bilateral or multilateral, do not
specify "the content of international responsibility including the forms of
reparation."52 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the recent model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) of the United
StateS53 and Canada5 4 are some notorious examples that limit the types of
available remedies to damages and restitution of property. For instance,
Article 1135(1) of NAFTA limits the availability of remedies to damages
and restitution of property. It sets out:
where a Tribunal makes a final award against a Party, the Tribunal
may award, separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary
damages and any applicable interest; and (b) restitution of
property, in which case the award shall provide that the disputing
Party may pay monetary damages and any applicable interest in
lieu of restitution.5 5
It thus excludes the availability of juridical restitution that may
require, among others, modification of regulations and annulment of
courts' judgments. Further, 1135(b) implies that the availability of
restitution of property is also very limited since in accordance with
Article 1135(b), the award should give the opportunity to a disputing
Party to pay damages in lieu of monetary compensation.
As a result, the current state of the law with regard to the availability
of specific performance is that it either does not specify the forms of
reparation or limits the scope of non-pecuniary remedies.
2. Case Law
This Part will examine the state of specific performance in the light of
case law pertaining to ISDS. It will only concentrate on cases that have
particularly addressed the remedy of specific performance in one way or
another. It thus will not look at cases that have addressed other forms of
52. See Martin Endicott, Remedies in Investor-State Arbitration: Restitution, Specific
Performance and Declaratory Awards, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
520 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Wllde eds., 2007) (noting that "it is rare for bilateral
investment treaties or investor-state concession contracts to specify the types of remedies that may
be ordered by an arbitral tribunal").
53. See U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 34 (2012).
54. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 570.
55. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1135(1), Dec. 8, 11, 14, & 17, 1992, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.
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non-pecumary remedies such as provisional measures and declaratory
reliefs.56
The TOPCO award was the first in investor-state arbitration in which
the tribunal ordered restitution and specific performance against a
sovereign state.5 7 The dispute arose out of 12 oil concession agreements
concluded between the Asiatic Oil Company and Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Company-the two companies brought their claims jointly
(TOPCO)--with Libya when the government of Libya issued decrees
nationalizing all of the rights, interests, and property of TOPCO on
September 1, 1973.8
As a result of this nationalization, TOPCO submitted the dispute to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause in each of the
concession agreements and asked the tribunal to grant specific
performance of contracts. Having found that the Libyan Government's
acts were illegal and unlawful, the sole arbitrator held that the agreements
were binding on the parties and that the "Libyan Government was legally
bound to perform the concession agreements and give them full force and
effect."5 9 Furthermore, in 1995, a dispute arose between Mr. Antoine
Goetz and five other Belgian investors who owned a company named
AFFIMET and Burundi when the latter withdrew "certificate of free
zone," which was granted to AFFIMET and entitled it to certain tax and
custom exemptions.60 As a result of the withdrawal of the certificate,
claimants brought a claim under the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic
Union-Burundi BIT and alleged, inter alia, that the withdrawal of the
certificate constituted an expropriation.61
In 1999, having found that the withdrawal of the certificate was indeed
an indirect expropriation, the tribunal took an innovative two-stage
approach toward the remedy of specific performance.6 2 Instead of an
immediate awarding of compensation or restitution, it gave Burundi an
opportunity either to live up to its international law obligations by
reissuing the certificate or compensating the claimants for failure to do
so. 6 3 This encouraged Burundi to voluntarily comply with its
international law obligation through the reissuance of the certificate.64
56. Two examples of such cases include Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 25, 2006), and Telefonica S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction (May 25, 2006).
57. Endicott, supra note 52, at 524.
58. Id. at 525.
59. Id.
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Enron v. Argentina is another case in which the tribunal confirmed its
authority to grant non-pecuniary remedies in accordance with the rules of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Convention (ICSID Convention). The dispute arose between the parties
where some Argentinean provinces imposed certain tax assessments with
respect to a gas transportation company in which the claimants
participated through investments in various corporate arrangements (the
alleged expropriation). The claimants had requested the tribunal to
declare the assessed taxes as an expropriation of investment "in breach of
the treaty and unlawful, and that they be annulled and their collection
permanently enjoined."65 The Argentine Republic objected to the
tribunal's authority to order injunctive relief as requested by the
claimants.
In response to the Argentine Republic's objection, the tribunal made
the following arguments.
An examination of the powers of international courts and tribunals to
order measures concerning performance or injunction and of the ample
practice that is available in this respect, leaves this Tribunal in no doubt
about the fact that these powers are indeed available. The Claimants have
convincingly invoked the authority of the Rainbow Warrior, where it was
held:
The authority to issue an order for the cessation or discontinuance
of a wrongful act or omission results from the inherent powers of
a competent tribunal which is confronted with the continuous
breach of an international obligation which is in force and
continues to be in force. The delivery of such an order requires,
therefore, two essential conditions intimately linked, namely that
the wrongful act has a continuing character and that the violated
rule is still in force at the time in which the order is issued.66
Based on this, the tribunal came to the conclusion that:
The same holds true under the ICSID Convention, "and in addition to
declaratory powers, [the tribunal] has the power to order measures
involving performance or injunction of certain acts." 67 "Jurisdiction is
therefore also affirmed on this ground. What kind of measures might or
might not be justified, whether the acts complained of meet the standards
set out in the Rainbow Warrior, and how the issue of implementation that
the parties have also discussed would be handled, if appropriate, are all
65. R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 1261 (2005).
66. PIERRE TERCIER, PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY RELIEF IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 202 (2012).
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matters that belong to the merits."68
Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that Enron withdrew the
claim in question, the tribunal never actually had to rule on the issue.69
In Nykomb v. Latvia, the tribunal also addressed the availability of
restitution and specific performance in ISDS.7 0 The case concerned a
claim for payment of a so-called double tariff for the supply of electricity
that arose under the Latvian Entrepreneurial Law and was enshrined in
the contract between the Latvian state electricity company, Latvenergo,
and the Nykomb's subsidiary, Windau.n The tribunal held "even if
damage or losses to an investment may be inflicted indirectly through
loss creating actions toward a subsidiary in the country of a Contracting
State, restitution must primarily be seen as an appropriate remedy in a
situation where a contracting state has instituted actions directly against
the investor."7 2 However, the tribunal found compensation to be an
appropriate remedy in the circumstances since it lacked the legal capacity
to order specific performance because "damage was inflicted indirectly
through loss creating actions toward a subsidiary in the contrary of a
Contracting State" while the shareholding company had initiated, the
arbitration.7 3 With regard to future payments, however, the tribunal held
that "the Republic of Latvia is ordered to ensure the payment of the
double tariff to Windau for electric power delivered from Windau's
cogeneration plant at Bauska in accordance with Contract for the period
from the date of this award until 16 September 2007,"74 which is clearly
an order for specific performance.75
As a result, in situations where the relevant obligations of a host state
remain in force, specific performance seems more appropriate compared
to monetary compensation76 as provided in Article 29 of the ILC
Articles.77
Micula v. Romania also acknowledges the arbitrator's power to order
for non-pecuniary remedies including specific performance. On August
68. Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Jan. 14, 2014).
69. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 209-16 (2007).
70. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award of Dec. 16, 2003.
71. Gisele Stephens-Chu, Is it Always All About the Money? The Appropriateness ofNon-
Pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT'L 661, 677 (2014) [hereinafter
Gisele].
72. SABAHI, supra note 36, at 84.
73. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB, Award of Dec. 16, 2003, at 44.
74. Id. § 7.1(b).
75. Gisele, supra note 71, at 678.
76. Id. at 679.
77. Article 29 of the ]LC Articles sets forth "The legal consequences of an internationally
wrongful act under this Part do not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform
the obligation breached." Int'l Law Comm'n, G.A. Res 56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
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2, 2005, Micula along with four other claimants (hereafter, the claimants)
brought an action against Romania in accordance with the Agreement
between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government
of Romania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
requesting restitution of the legal framework governing their
investment.7 8 Romania argued that the claim for restitution of the legal
regime is inadmissible79 for four main reasons: Firstly, "it would be
absurd and unjust for Romania to reinstate an old regulatory regime that
would likely breach the EC Treaty."80 Secondly, "Romania has not
undertaken any obligation to take or maintain a specific regulatory
regime."8 Thirdly, "restitution sought would not flow directly from the
causes of action."82 Finally, "no form of restitution can be awarded
(whether by way of order or declaration) when that would impinge on the
state's regulatory sovereignty."83 The claimants argued that the claim for
restitution is admissible and decision and discussions on remedies should
be made on the merit phase.84 At the jurisdictional phase and in stark
contrast with Romania's arguments, the tribunal argued as follows:
Under the ICSID Convention, a tribunal has the power to order
pecuniary or non-pecuniary remedies, including restitution, i.e., re-
establishing the situation which existed before a wrongful act was
committed. As Respondent itself admits, restitution is, in theory, a
remedy that is available under the ICSID Convention. That
admission essentially disposes of the objection as an objection to
jurisdiction and admissibility. The fact that restitution is a rarely
ordered remedy is not relevant at this stage of the proceedings.
Similarly, and contrary to Respondent's argument, the fact that
such a remedy might not be enforceable pursuant to Article 54 of
the ICSID Convention should not preclude a tribunal from
ordering it. Remedies and enforcement are two distinct concepts.8 5
In addition, the Tribunal finds no limitation to its powers to order
restitution in the BIT, the instrument on which the consent of the parties
is based. While Article 4 of the BIT dealing with expropriation only
mentions compensation, it does not rule out restitution. Moreover, the rest
78. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, T 7 (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/25691337?seq=1#page
scan-tab contents.
79. Id. ¶ 159.
80. Id. ¶ 160.
81. Id.T161.
82. Id. 1162.
83. Id. ¶ 163.
84. Id. IT 51-52.
85. Id. ¶ 166.
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of the BIT provisions do not preclude a tribunal from ordering restitution,
if and when appropriate, for a violation of other substantive provisions.
Article 7 of the BIT contains no further limitations to the Tribunal's
powers in that respect. 86
The Tribunal therefore does have the powers to order restitution, both
under the ICSID Convention and the BIT, and thus cannot uphold
Respondent's objection as an objection to jurisdiction and admissibility.
Ultimately, whether restitution is an appropriate remedy, and whether
restitution or compensation should be ordered, are questions properly
addressed at the merits phase of the proceedings. It is premature to
discuss this issue at this juncture. It requires, in any event, a showing by
Claimants that Respondent violated the BIT.8 7
On December 11, 2013, the tribunal rendered its final award on the
merits. At the merit phase, in spite of the fact that the claimants
abandoned their request for restitution88 they applied for interim
measures and post-award injunctive relief.89 The purpose of interim
measures was to prevent Romania from collecting taxes from the
claimants until the tribunal renders the final award. The tribunal accepted
such a request which precluded Romania from collecting taxes from the
claimants up until the issuance of the final award. The reason behind post-
award injunctive relief was a reaction to Romania's application to revoke
provisional measures and ensure the claimants that Romania "is enjoined
from any further tax collection measures of any kind in respect of the
Claimants and the EFDC until such a time as the damages awarded by
the Tribunal have been paid in full, and include a pecuniary alternative in
case of non-performance."90
With regard to the claimants' request for post-award injunctive relief,
although the tribunal, in the first place, did find itself competent to award
such remedy, it refused to grant it mainly because the claimants' request
for such remedy was not made timely and expressly. The tribunal, by
making reference to its decision on jurisdiction and admissibility and
recognizing its competency to grant non-pecuniary remedies, held: "Non-
pecuniary relief may take many forms, such as restitution or specific
performance. It may also take the form of definitive (i.e., not provisional)
injunctive relief, if the Tribunal finds that such relief is necessary to
ensure that the breach will be redressed."91
The tribunal continued and opined:
86. Id ¶ 167.
87. Id ¶ 168.
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The Tribunal concludes that it has the power to grant injunctive
relief in a final award. This relief, however, must be definitive (i.e.,
not provisional, not meant to "preserve the respective rights of
either party" until final resolution of the dispute, which is the
objective of provisional measures pursuant to Article 47 of the
ICSID Convention). The Tribunal prefers the term "definitive" to
"permanent", as the relief granted may be temporary (i.e., granted
only until a certain date or until a certain condition is met).
However, as the Tribunal will become functus officio upon the
rendering of the Award (subject to a party filing a claim for
rectification, supplementary decision, interpretation or revision of
the Award pursuant to Articles 49, 50 or 51 of the ICSID
Convention), the injunctive relief granted cannot be later
reconsidered or lifted by the Tribunal, as would be the case with
provisional relief: such definitive injunctive relief would have res
judicata effect.92
Nevertheless, the tribunal did not grant post-award injunctive relief in
the favor of the claimants mainly on the grounds that the request had not
been made expressly and timely.
The tribunal in ATA v. Jordan granted the claimant a juridical
restitution.93 The dispute arose when a state-controlled company applied
to the Jordanian Court of Appeal to set aside an arbitral award that has
been rendered in favor of ATA. 94 When the Jordanian Court of Appeal
annulled the arbitral award, ATA brought an action before the ICSID
tribunal alleging the unlawful expropriation of its claims to money and
rights to legitimate performance under the Contract and the Final Award,
as well as the failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to its
investment, inter alia by way of serious and repeated denials ofjustice by
the Jordanian courts.9 5 The tribunal held "the single remedy which can
implement the Chorzow standard is a restoration of the Claimant's right
to arbitration."96 It ordered that that "the ongoing Jordanian court
proceedings in relation to the Dike No. 19 dispute be immediately and
unconditionally terminated, with no possibility to engage further judicial
proceedings in Jordan or elsewhere on the substance of the dispute."97
In Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan, which was held under the rules of the
Energy Charter Treaty, the tribunal not only held that it has the power to
order specific performance, but also regarded specific performance an
92. Id.¶1313.
93. ATA Constr., Indus. & Trading Co. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award, 1
121 (May 18, 2010).
94. Id. T 1.
95. Id. T 37.
96. Id. ¶131.
97. Id. ¶¶ 132-33.
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appropriate remedy in situations where a breach has a continuing
character.9 8 The tribunal also ruled that the possible problems of
enforcement do not per se make specific performance an impermissible
remedy.99 In the case at hand, however, the tribunal found specific
performance materially impossible due to the following reason:
Nine years have elapsed since Claimant has left Tajikistan. During
that period Claimant has had no activities in the country, nor has it
been shown that Claimant engaged in exploration and
development activities in the oil and gas sector elsewhere.
Claimant has had no working relationship with Tajikistan and
indeed has had difficulty even obtaining visas to visit the
country.100
"During the past nine year period .. . third parties have become active
in the four geographic areas where Claimant had been promised exclusive
licenses. There is also no evidence that their rights were obtained through
bad faith conduct on their parts."01
A similar approach was taken by the Bitwater Gauff v. Tanzania
tribunal. In that case, the tribunal held that, "[In cases where
expropriation] take[s] place by reason of a substantial interference with
rights, even if no economic loss is caused thereby, or can be calculated,
non-pecuniary remedies (e.g. injunctive, declaratory or restitutionary
relief) may still be appropriate."10 2
Finally, Arifv. Republic ofMoldova 03 is among the most significant
and interesting cases that has ever been decided with regard to the
availability of non-pecuniary remedies in ISDS. Unlike many other cases
in which host states have challenged the tribunal's competency to grant
non-pecuniary remedies for reasons such as incompatibility of non-
pecuniary remedies with states' sovereignty, in this case, it was the
Republic of Moldova which insisted on restitution in lieu of damages
award.10 4 Further, the circumstances of the case show that the claimant
98. Al Bahloul v. Tajikistan, Case No. V(064/2008), Final Award, IT 47-48 (June 8,2010).
99. Id. ¶ 50.
100. Id. 54.
101. Id.¶56.
102. Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 1781 (July 24,2008).
103. Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award (Apr. 8, 2013).
104. Moldova in its counter memorial argued "restitution is the primary form of reparation
for an internationally wrongful act. Although claimant does not seek restitution, respondent
reserves the right to request that restitution be the relief ordered, if any, to the extent it is possible
and lawful under the circumstances and in light of the particular obligation the tribunal may
determine that respondent has breached." Id ¶ 269. According to the respondent, it "should have
the opportunity to provide restitution as an alternative to damages, as this remedy would restore
claimant to the position he would have been in without any violation of the BIT, and also avoids
the uncertainties of the calculation of damages, including the possibility of risk free windfall
19
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also was not against restitution. In fact, it seems that the main reason
behind the claimant's preference for damages was that he was not
confident that the respondent would comply with its obligation
specifically;os the tribunal expressly mentioned that restitution as a
remedy is in accordance with the nature of investment treaties and
contracts. According to the tribunal "the general position in international
law is that the injured State may elect between the available forms of
reparation and may prefer compensation to restitution. On the other hand,
restitution is more consistent with the objectives of bilateral investment
treaties, as it preserves both the investment and the relationship between
the investor and the Host State." 0 6 Finally, the award gave the
opportunity to the claimant to choose from restitution and
compensation.10 7
The dispute between the parties arose when the Republic of Moldova
delayed or prevented the opening of several duty free stores granted to
Mr. Arif (the claimant), and breached an exclusivity undertaking thereby
to ensure fair and equitable treatment to Claimant's investment in some
of the duty free stores.108 Consequently, the claimant brought an action
against the respondent for the breach of fair and equitable treatment in
accordance with the BIT concluded between France and the Republic of
Moldova.109 Although the Tribunal did not accept all of the claimant's
claims, it confirmed the respondent's failure to meet its treaty obligations
with regard to the duty free store at Chisinau Airport.10
Regarding to the requested remedy and in order to reconcile the
interests of the claimant and respondent as well as objectives of bilateral
investment treaties, the tribunal held:
The Tribunal considers restitution to be the preferable remedy, but
as in the present case Respondent has not been able to confirm that
profits." Id. ¶ 569.
105. In relation to the airport store, claimant stated that "restitution would require
respondent o allow and to enable claimant to open and operate his duty free store at Chisinau
International Airport without undue interruption. This would require all relevant licenses and
authorizations to be (re)issued by Respondent and its organs to Le Bridge, as well as a new lease
agreement, at identical or essentially similar terms as the former Airport Lease agreement, leasing
out the exact same premises at the Airport to Le Bridge for the same duration (and preferential
renewal rights), which would start to run at the date of the actual opening of the Airport store."
Id. 566. The claimant continued and pointed out that "in his view, the reality is that respondent
is unwilling or unable to extend a firm offer for restitution, backed by adequate guarantees and so
insisted on reparation in the form of damages." d. ¶ 567.
106. Id. 570.
107. Id. ¶ 633.
108. Id. T 1.
109. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of
the Republic of Moldova on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments dated
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restitution is possible, and the Tribunal cannot supervise any
restitutionary remedy, the best course is to order restitution and
compensation as alternatives, with the remedy of compensation
suspended for a period of ninety days. This provides Respondent
with the opportunity, in light of the findings of this award, to
formulate and propose to Claimant the exact mechanism of
restitution. If restitution is not possible, or the terms of restitution
proposed by Respondent are not satisfactory to Claimant then the
damages awarded will satisfy the violation of Claimant's right to
fair and equitable treatment. This solution provides a final
opportunity to preserve the investment, while also preserving
Claimant's right to damages if a satisfactory restitutionary solution
cannot be found."1
The tribunal went on and opined:
Accordingly, the Tribunal decides that, within a period of no more
than sixty days, Respondent will make a proposal to Claimant for
the restitution of the investment in the Airport store, including its
proposals as to appropriate guarantees for the legality of a new
lease agreement. The Tribunal expects the Parties to negotiate
regarding this proposal in good faith, but confirms that Claimant
at any time within a period of ninety days from the date of this
award may elect to take the compensation as quantified in this
Award in lieu of restitution and Respondent is obliged to make the
payment accordingly.112
D. Specific Performance Under the PICC
The PICC is an "elaboration of restatement of general principles of
contract law."' 13 It was first published in 1994,114 with a second and third
edition published respectively in 20041" and 2010."' It provides a
unified set of "rules of law" that are suitable for international commercial
111. Id. ¶571.
112. Id. 572.
113. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 1.
114. For the 1994 version of the PICC, see International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT (1994),
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-1994.
115. For the 2004 version of the PICC, see International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT (2004),
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2004.
116. For the 2010 version of the PICC, see International Institute for the Unification of
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contracts. Nonetheless, dissimilar to traditional ways of harmonization
that usually take the form of binding bilateral and multilateral treaties or
conventions, the PICC is an academic work of comparative law" 7 with a
non-binding nature. 18 Accordingly, it, as a general principle, comes into
play only where the parties expressly opt for it as an applicable law in
their contract. The Preamble of the PICC, however, gives a full picture of
the role and function of the PICC. According to the Preamble:
These Principles set forth general rules for international
commercial contracts. They shall be applied when the parties have
agreed that their contract be governed by them. They may be
applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be
governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the
like. They may be applied when the parties have not chosen any
law to govern their contract. They may be used to interpret or
supplement international uniform law instruments. They may be
used to interpret or supplement domestic law. They may serve as
a model for national and international legislators.19
The PICC deals with non-performance and remedies arising out of it
in chapter 7.120 It provides three main remedies for an aggrieved party
confronting non-performance: specific performance, termination, and
damages. The PICC does not, however, establish a hierarchy among the
available remedies.121 That is, an aggrieved party may resort to any
remedy he pleases, unless the conditions for the asserted remedy are not
satisfied.12 2
Section 2 of chapter 7 of the PICC deals with conditions under which
an aggrieved party might require specific performance of an obligation.12 3
The PICC, however, distinguishes between requiring specific
performance of monetary and non-monetary obligations.1 2 4 With the
effect that in the former case, requiring specific performance of an
obligation is always possible,125 but in the latter case, the PICC
recognizes the primacy of specific performance as a principle and then
117. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 26.
118. Id. at 5.
119. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of Int'l
Commercial Contracts, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law].
120. The structure of chapter 7 is such that in section 1 it addresses non-performance in
general. Section 2 is concerned with the right to specific performance. Section 3 addresses the
right to terminate the contract. Finally section 4 discusses the right to claim damages. Id. at 223-
24.
121. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 728.
122. Id.
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lays down exceptions to it.12 6
The PICC recognizes the right to demand specific performance as a
primary remedy.12 7 Nonetheless, to reconcile the different approaches
taken by civil law and common law systems, Article 7.2.2 of the PICC
through paragraphs (a) to (e) comes up with some significant exceptions
to specific performance of non-monetary obligations.12 8 The exceptions
apply, for instance, where "performance is impossible in law or in fact";
or "performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably
burdensome or expensive."129
In both cases of requiring performance of monetary and non-monetary
obligations, however, the parties have a broad discretion to exclude or
limit the provisions on non-performance and the available remedies.13 0
Therefore, the parties might exclude the possibility of requiring specific
performance in the contract or they may attach additional requirements
to a request for performance."' However, other provisions of the PICC
might impose restrictions on the parties' ability to exclude or limit
liability or available remedies.13 2 For instance, Article 7.1.6 of the PICC
sets out, "a clause which limits or excludes one party's liability for non-
performance or which permits one party to render performance
substantially different from what the other party reasonably expected may
not be invoked if it would be grossly unfair to do so, having regard to the
purpose of the contract."1 3 3
Under the PICC "specific performance is not a discretionary remedy,
i.e. a court must order performance, unless one of the exceptions laid
down in this Article applies."'3 4 That is, an aggrieved party is entitled
both to demand specific performance from the other party and to require
its enforcement by a court.13 5
E. The Relevance of PICC to ISDS
The PICC is an "elaboration of restatement of general principles of
contract law."136 Therefore, a comparative study of this instrument as a
basis for analysis of specific performance in the context of ISDS might
126. Id. at 240 (noting that "following the basic approach of CISG (Article 46) this Article
adopts the principle of specific performance, subject to certain qualifications").
127. Id.
128. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, art. 7.2.2.
129. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, supra note 119, at 423.
130. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 731.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 7.1.6.
134. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, supra note 119, art. 7.2.2. cmt. 2.
135. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9; Int'l Int. for the Unification of
Private Law, supra note 119, art. 7.2.1, cmt. 2.
136. See PICC 2010, supra note 116, at xxii.
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seem bizarre. As a result, it is indispensible to specify the relevance of
the PICC in ISDS.
In order to determine the role and relevance of the PICC in ISDS, it is
first necessary to identify sources of law applicable to investment
disputes. Generally speaking, rules of international law, investment
treaties, "rules of law" chosen by the parties, and the domestic law of host
state are four primary sources of law applicable to ISDS; depending on
the nature of the claim, that is, whether it is contractual or based on a
treaty, these sources may be applied individually or jointly.137 For
instance, in the absence of an explicit choice of law and in circumstances
where an investor brings a claim in accordance with the standards of
protection in the investment treaty, case law regards it as an implicit
choice of international law.1 38 In addition, depending on the applicable
arbitration rules, in the absence of choice of law by the parties, the
tribunal may be required to apply the national law of the host state or
another national law that may be determined as being applicable by the
conflict rules of the host State's law. The international law, however,
shall be used to fill the gaps in the national law or correct the national law
to the extent that application of national law would lead to a violation of
public international law obligations of the state.139
In accordance with the well-established principle of party autonomy,
most arbitration rules allow the parties to choose applicable law to their
contract and to this effect, arbitration rules use a wide language of "rules
of law."l 40 It is now beyond doubt that the PICC falls within the scope of
"rules of law" that the parties may choose as applicable law to their
dispute.141
In situations where the applicable law to the investment dispute is the
national law of the host state, the PICC also may play a corroborative or
corrective role of the national law. The Preamble of the PICC, as we
addressed above, allow such a function for the PICC.
Moreover, in circumstances where the applicable law is international
law, Article 38(1)(c) of the statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ statute) provides the authority for the use of the PICC in settling
disputes arising from breach of a treaty obligation since general principles
of law are one of the sources of international law that a judge may apply
137. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 201.
138. Giuditta Cordero-Moss & Daniel Behn, The Relevance ofthe UNIDROIT Principles in
Investment Arbitration, 19 UNIFORM L. REv. 570, 575 (2014) [hereinafter Moss & Behn].
139. Id. at 576.
140. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, art. 42(1),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf; UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, art. 35(1), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-
2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf; ICC Arbitration Rules, art. 21(1), http://www.
iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/.
141. Moss & Behn, supra note 138, at 575.
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in settling disputes between states. Taking into account the fact that the
PICC is a restatement of general principles of contract law, it may find a
way into treaty arbitration as well.
Some might, however, argue that not all of the PICC provisions, such
as those provisions regarding "change of remedy" and "accumulation of
remedies," amount to general principles of law in accordance with Article
31(3)(c) of the ICJ Statute so that one cannot make use of all of the
provisions of the PICC as representing the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. Thomas W. Wailde reacts to such a claim
in the best way; he argues "international law is defined in Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute for ICJ inter-State adjudication. But this provision reflects
the bygone area of international law as a law exclusively betweer Nation-
States. That is no longer appropriate for the modern global economy
where market States and non-State actors participate as law-creating and
law enforcing players. "One should therefore not exclude the possibility
that instruments of international law, such as treaties and other
instruments for harmonizing international commercial law (e.g.
UNIDROIT Principles on Contract Law), can also help to inform the
interpretation of investment treaty terms." 42 He continues and points out:
While "lex mercatoria " as an expression of international business
custom is far from the vision of public international lawyers, the
wide reference to "international law" in Article 31(3)(c) and the
tripartite nature of investment arbitration including a non-State
element does not preclude taking account of non-traditional
sources of international law. 143
It has also been argued that:
the practice of states as expressed in arbitration treaties
determining the sources of law to be applied by international
judges shows that, rules of international law stipulated by custom
and treaty regarded as incomplete and insufficient. There exists a
customary law to the effect that general principles of law, justice
and equity should, in addition and apart from custom and treaties,
be treated as binding upon international tribunals.
144
Last but not least, the PICC has recently gained significant attention
142. Thomas W. Walde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 775 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
143. Id.
144. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 298-99 (1970).
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in literaturel45 and jurisprudence; arbitral tribunals and parties to the
dispute increasingly and steadily rely on the PICC to settle investor-state
disputes either for breaches that arise from a mere contractual relationship
or breaches that stem from treaty obligations 46 such as a breach of fair
and equitable treatment standard.147 In fact, the tribunals have used the
PICC as a "rules of law" chosen by the parties,14 8 as a source of
international law 49 where they represent general principles of law,so as
corroboration of international law,1 51 and as corroboration of national
law.1 52 From substantive perspective, the tribunals have used the PICC
for the purpose of, among others, interpretation of contract,153
determining the amount of payable damages,154 entitlement of the
145. See generally Michael Joachim Bonell, International Investment Contracts and
General Contract Law: A Place for the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts?, 17 UNIFORM L. REv. 141, 159 (2012); Piero Bernardini, UNIDROIT Principles and
International Investment Arbitration, 19 UNIFORM L. REv. 561 (2014); Andrea Marco
Steingruber, El Paso v. Argentine Republic: UNIDROIT Principles ofInternational Commercial
Contracts as a Reflection of 'General Principles ofLaw Recognized by Civilized Nations' in the
Context'of an Investment Treaty Claim, 18 UNIFORM L. REV. 509 (2013); Moss & Behn, supra
note 138; August Reinisch, The Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts in International Investment Arbitration, 19 UNIFORM L. REV. 609 (2014).
146. Steingruber, supra note 145, at 529.
147. Bernardini, supra note 145, at 561.
148. See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 111 (Jan. 14, 2010); Moss & Behn, supra note 138, at 581.
149. Petrobart, Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003, Arbitral Award (Mar. 29,
2005), at 88.
150. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶881 (Dec. 11, 2013).
151. The use of the PICC as a corroboration of international law refers to situations where
arbitral tribunals use the PICC not as an independent proof of general principles of law, rather
they use it as corroborating evidence alongside other sources of law. Moss & Behn, supra note
138, at 588; see also Eureko v. Poland, Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award (Aug. 19,
2005), TT 176-178; Gemplus & Talsud v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3, Award (June
16, 2010). In order to support and corroborate this principle, the tribunal cited article 7.4.3(1) of
the PICC which requires a "reasonable degree of certainty" for establishing compensation for
harm including future harm; some tribunals have taken a step forward and held that "the PICC is
neither a treaty, nor compilation of usages, nor standard terms of contract. It is in fact a
manifestation of transnational law." Lemire, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, 1 109. In this sense,
some tribunals have used the PICC as corroboration of general principles of law that "figure
prominently among" sources of international law. Ralf Michaels, The UNIDROIT Principles as
Global Background Law, 19 UNIFORM L. REV. 643, 653 (2014).
152. The use of the PICC as a corroboration of national law is where the arbitral tribunal
find domestic law as an applicable law to settle the dispute and uses the PICC to supplement and
interpret the domestic law. Moss & Behn, supra note 138, at 596. For the list of cases that has
used the PICC as corroboration of national law, see African Holding Co. of Am., Inc. v. La
Rdpublique d6mocratique du Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/21, Sentence sur les d6clinatoires
de comp6tence et la recevabilit6 (July 29, 2008); Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi v. Libya,
Final Arbitral Award, 368-72 (Mar. 22, 2013).
153. Michaels, supra note 151, at 661.
154. Al-Kharafi, Final Arbitral Award, at 370-72.
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aggrieved party to interest,tI" and recoverability of lost profit.1 56
One of the general principles that the PICC expressly underlies has to
do with the general principle of specific performance. This principle is
closely connected with the principle of pacta sunt servanda and an
aggrieved party's immediate right to specific performance is the
consequence of the binding nature of obligations under the PICC.
The principle of pacta sunt servanda already exists in international
law. However, the effect of breach of the principle is not clear in
international law as it is in contract law. Therefore, the paper argues that
the PICC could make a significant contribution in order to make it clear.
Furthermore, one can also infer the doctrines of "change of remedy"
and "accumulation of remedies" from the [LC Articles as a codification
of international customary law. The role of the PICC in this study shall
be a contribution to the completeness of international law with respect to
the effect of breach of the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the
necessity for accumulation and change of remedy in international
investment law.
It might be argued that the doctrines of "change of remedy" and
"accumulation of remedies" followed from the ILC Articles and
completed with the PICC may not be applied to the investment treaties
that restrict the forms of reparation to monetary compensation. In
response, the paper puts forward that it is not the mere review of the law
and case law rather it is intended to be a forward-looking study. In fact,
the paper specified the state of the law in previous section and shall argue
that based on some policy considerations as discussed in Part II and
necessities as explored in Part III, full-on prohibitions of the remedy of
specific performance should not be written into the texts of future
investment treaties nor read into the texts of the many existing treaties
that are silent with regard to the types of available remedies.
F. Concept ofSpecific Performance
Given that various legal systems treat specific performance differently
both in terms of terminology used and the content of the remedy, it is
difficult and unrealistic to come up with one single definition to
encompass all features of specific performance in different legal
systems.'5 7 "Nevertheless, specific performance is, broadly speaking, a
mechanism through which a party may require the other party to meet its
155. Petrobart, SCC Case No. 126/2003, at 88.
156. Gemplus, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/3, at 13-88.
157. Nayiri Boghossian, A Comparative Study of Specific Performance Provisions in the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in PACE REVIEW OF
THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 30 (1999-2000).
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obligations under the contract or [treaty]."ss In fact, it is a "process
whereby the creditor obtains as nearly as possible the actual subject-
matter of his bargain. "159
This definition, especially the phrase "as nearly as possible," fits the
context of this Article; because where a non-performing party is
compelled to meet his original obligations under the contract or treaty, an
aggrieved party does not usually get what the parties actually contracted
for since there is naturally a delay between the time in which the obligor
was supposed to perform the contract and the time he actually executes
the contract. Therefore, in order to give full effect to the remedy of
specific performance and respect for the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
the aggrieved party, besides specific performance, must be able to claim
damages for losses that specific performance has not remediated.
G. Types of Specific Performance
This Part will address the types and examples of specific performance
in contract and investment law.
Generally speaking, the form of specific performance will depend on
the nature of undertaken obligation. In one classification, one can divide
obligations into two categories of positive and negative obligations.
Positive obligations refer to situations where the obligor undertakes to
accomplish "certain physical or legal state of affairs." 60 Negative
obligations relate to situations in which a promisor obligates himself to
refrain from doing something.161 Accordingly, an order for specific
performance could be negative or positive in nature.162
Had the obligor failed to meet his positive obligation; an order for
specific performance would require the obligor to achieve that state of
affairs. In contract law, take the example of a sales contract in which the
seller undertakes to deliver the goods in a specific period of time, if he
fails to deliver the goods at all, a buyer may require the delivery of the
goods. In the context of investment law, if a state undertakes to treat a
foreign investor in a fair and equitable manner and fails to do so, an order
for specific performance would mean requiring the state to treat the
investor in a fair and equitable manner, for instance, by not increasing the
amount of payable taxes. Specific performance in this context is a
"remed[y] that purport[s] to constrain the manner in which a government
may exercise its powers."l6 3 If the state is compelled to bring tax
158. CHENGWEI, supra note 6, at 14.
159. TREITEL, supra note 3, at 43.
160. Id; HUGH BEALE, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 125 (1980).
161. Id
162. 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 156 (3d ed. 2004).
163. JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 60 (2014).
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regulation in compliance with the terms of an investment agreement or
the contract, specific performance will preclude incurring future losses to
the investor (prospective effect). However, before the state amends its tax
regulation, the investor might incur losses for increases resulting from
change of tax regulation. Therefore, the state must compensate those
losses in accordance with the principle of full compensation
(retrospective effect).
Moreover, an order for specific performance of negative obligations
shall mean stopping the obligor from doing something he was supposed
not to do, or preventing him from doing those things in the future.'64 For
instance, if under a technology transfer agreement, a buyer undertakes to
not disclose trade secretes relating to the sold goods, he will breach his
obligation when he discloses secret information. Therefore, an order for
specific performance would mean stopping the buyer from continuing to
disclose. In the context of investment law, an order for specific
performance of negative obligation could be preventing a state from
discriminating against the foreign investor in breach of treaty obligation.
Specific performance in this context is also a "remed[y] that purport[s] to
constrain the manner in which a government may exercise its powers."l65
Based on the nature of an assumed obligation, specific performance
in investment law, by and large, might include "(i) the annulling of a
governmental measure or decision; (ii) injunctions (requiring a party to
do or to refrain from doing something); and (iii) declarations of the rights
and obligations of the parties, or a declaration that a particular
administrative decision was illegal without otherwise stating any
consequences."66
From another perspective and based on the definition of non-
performance, an order for specific performance might take different
forms. For instance, the PICC uses a unified concept of non-performance
that embraces all forms of non-performance-either total non-
performance or defective performance.167 Total non-performance means
that an obligor entirely fails to live up to his obligation such as where the
obligor fails to deliver the agreed upon goods. Defective performance
involves circumstances in which the obligor fails to meet an obligation
exactly in accordance with the terms of the contract; meets only parts of
his obligations, for instance, delivers only parts of the goods; or delays in
performing his obligations.
As a result, depending on the form of non-performance, an order for
164. TREITEL, supra note 3, at 43; see BEALE, supra note 160, at 125.
165. BONNITCHA, supra note 163, at 60.
166. Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy
Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment (Mar. 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf.
167. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, art. 7.1.1.
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specific performance might take different forms. This classification of
types of specific performance falls within the general classification.
II. FEASIBILITY AND COMPATIBILITY OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
A. The Principle ofPacta Sunt Servanda Under the PICC
The PICC recognizes specific performance as a general principle and
regard it as a natural consequence of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.168 The binding nature of the contract itself is the result of the
principle of party autonomy.'69
In international trade practice, these principles play a crucial part in
an open market economy; because "they ensure that commercial parties
are free to decide to whom they will offer their goods or services, and by
whom they wish to be supplied, as well as to freely agree on the terms of
those transactions. Once such voluntary agreements have been reached,
security of the transaction requires them to be enforced. This process of
voluntary exchange promotes economic growth through competition and
the efficient allocation of resources."7 0 Therefore, these principles serve
the purpose of stability and certainty in international trade.'7 '
Accordingly, breach of the principle of pacta sunt servanda should be
taken seriously. The Official Comment to Article 7.2.2 of the PICC lays
out the immediate effect of failing to meet contractual obligations and the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. It provides "in accordance with the
general principle of the binding character of the contract, each party
should as a rule be entitled to require performance by the other party not
only of monetary, but also of non-monetary obligations, assumed by that
party."
The official comment to Article 7.2.2 of the PICC continues and sets
forth
the principle [of specific performance] is particularly important
with respect to contracts other than sales contracts. Unlike the
obligation to deliver something, contractual obligations to do
something or to abstain from doing something can often be
performed only by the other contracting party itself. In such cases
168. See PICC 2010, supra note 16, art. 1.3.
169. See id art. 1.5, cmt. 1.
170. Nicole Kornet, Evolving General Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
The UNIDROIT Principles and Favor Contractus, Working Paper No. 2011/07, at 3 (Univ. of
Maastricht), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 756751
171. Id. at 14.
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the only way of obtaining performance from a party who is
unwilling to perform is by enforcement.17 2
Therefore, under the PICC the most significant foundation of the right
to specific performance is the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the
immediate consequences of its breach is an aggrieved party's right to
choose specific performance.17 3 The structure of remedies in the PICC
and many provisions under it clearly demonstrate the importance of
sticking to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. For instance, a court's
power to direct a non-performing party to pay a penalty if it does not
comply with the order for specific performance,17 4 a non-performing
party's right to cure non-performance175 and subjecting termination to the
fundamentality of breach are among the provisions that show the PICC's
tendency toward specific performance.176
B. The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda in ISDS
1. The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda Lies at the Heart of Public
International Law
The principle of pacta sunt servanda is the most vital general principle
of international law as well as international investment law.1 7 7 Article 26
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth "every treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith." This means that the parties of any treaty including a
bilateral or multilateral investment treaty are obligated to perform the
assumed obligations under the treaty.78
Furthermore, most investment treaties make an explicit reference to
the parties' obligations to observe the terms of the treaty and agreements
with investors. For instance, the bilateral treaty of 1959 between
Germany and Pakistan in Article 7 lays down "either party shall observe
any other obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments
172. See PICC 2010, supra note 116, art. 7.2.2., cmt. 1.
173. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at 784.
174. See PICC 2010, supra note 116, art. 7.2.4(1).
175. See id. art. 7.4.1.
176. See id. art. 7.3.1.
177. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL,
CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 319 (2013); JESWALD
W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 62 (2009); GODEFRIDUS J.H. HOOF,
RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1983).
178. YuSUF CALISKAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE OECD MAI NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO A POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT 23 (SJD dissertation 2008); GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 559 (2015).
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by nationals or companies of the other party." 79
Also Article 15(2) of the Czech Republic and Singapore BIT 1995
reads "each contracting party shall observe commitments, additional to
those specified in this agreement, it has entered into with respect to
investment of the investors of the other contracting party. Each
contracting party shall not interfere with any commitments, additional to
those specified in this Agreement, entered into by nationals or companies
with the nationals or companies of the other contracting party as regards
their investments."s0 Although the language of such clauses differs from
one treaty to the next,181 its purpose is to reject the idea that "governments
can breach contracts at will-it affirms . .. the position that governments
have an international duty not to rely on governmental powers to breach
contracts concluded with foreign investors." 82
Nevertheless, when a state breaches its obligations, courts and arbitral
tribunals normally award monetary compensation. This Article submits
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a starting point obligates a
sovereign state to observe its obligations under an investment contract or
a treaty. If it fails to meet its obligations either under the investment
contract or the treaty, an immediate effect of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda would be the investor's right to choose specific performance of
its obligations. In this regard, it does not matter whether the state has
breached its treaty obligation, contractual promises, or both of them. This
position is confirmed by the PICC as an example of modern contract law
that can be used as a source of international law, corroboration of
international law, as a law chosen by the parties, source of national law,
and corroboration of domestic law.1 8 3 This does not, however, mean that
specific performance must take precedence over pecuniary damages.
Rather, it means that when an aggrieved party opts for specific
performance, a court or a tribunal should be able to grant specific
179. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange
of notes), Pak.-Ger. at 28, Nov. 25, 1959, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2006/investment-pakistangermany.pdf
180. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 15(2), Apr. 8, 1995,
available at http://investment policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/981.
181. See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment
Agreements, OECD Working Papers on International Investment (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2006_3.pdf; Patricio Grand & Brian
Bombassaro, Umbrella Clause Decisions: The Class of 2012 and a Remapping of the
Jurisprudence, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/01/17/
umbrella-clause-decisions-the-class-of-2012-and-a-remapping-of-the-jurisprudence/; Elisabeth
Meurling & Bart Volders, Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Litigation, 2 EuR. PUB.
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP L. REv. 80, 80-90 (2007).
182. Thomas W. Walde, The "Umbrella" Clause (or Sanctity of Contract/Pact sunt
Servanda Clause) in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent
Cases, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 30 (2005), available at http://www.biicl.org/files/946_thomas_
waldepresentation.pdf.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
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performance unless one of the exceptions to the right to require
performance is satisfied; for example, where a state confiscates a ship
belonging to an investor and then it sank by natural means.1 84 The
principle of pacta sunt servanda should be taken seriously especially
where the host state acts arbitrarily and in bad faith.
2. Specific Performance Meets Parties' Expectations
The simplest philosophy behind why specific performance should be
available has to do with the fact that this is what the parties contracted
for.'85 "The parties to a transaction often take great care in defining their
respective rights and obligations, the performance they expect from each
other. One must assume that, unless substantial changes occurred, they
wish to receive this performance."1 86 There should be no difference as to
contracts between states and investors. When a state enters into a contract
with a foreign investor, it creates the expectation in the foreign investor
that it will live up to its obligations under the contract or it will observe
obligations imposed by treaty on it; otherwise it is highly unlikely for a
foreign investor to enter into a contract with a state. It is reasonable to
expect the parties to any contract, be it between two states, between an
individual and a state or between two individuals, to meet their
obligations as originally agreed by them. Professor Dunn argues that
"private individuals making contracts with foreign governments do not
ordinarily foresee that the government will in the future resort to its
governmental power to defeat its obligations under the contract. If they
did, they would make no such contracts at all, since the scope of
governmental power is such as to be able to defeat any normal basis of
outcome of the contractual relationship."l8 7 Therefore, this reasonable
expectation should be respected. The law of many countries recognizes
the binding nature of state contract with individuals.' For instance, the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case of Perry v. United
States best illuminates this point. In that case, the court held that "the
United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals ...
when the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it
has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who
184. Hindelang, supra note 36, at 3.
185. Eustace Chikere Azukibe, The Place of Treaties in International Investment, 19 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 155, 176 (2013) (noting that "the underlying philosophy behind pacta
sunt servanda is the idea that it is proper for individuals to be bound by their promises").
186. Schneider, supra note 18, at 4.
187. Fredrick Dunn, The Protection of Nationals, in the Sanctity of Contract Between a
Sovereign and a Foreign National, A.B.A. SEC. MINERAL & NAT. RES. L. PROC. 177, 181 (1957).
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are parties to such instruments."'89 According to the court "this is
recognized in the field of international engagements. Although there may
be no judicial procedure by which such contracts may be enforced in the
absence of the consent of the sovereign to be sued, the engagement
validly made by a sovereign state is not without legal force."' 90 The court
also continued and held "the binding quality of the promise of the United
States is of the essence of the credit pledged. The fact that the United
States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which
does not affect the legality and binding character of its contracts." 9 1
If a state recognizes the binding nature of its contracts with its citizens,
it could not change its obligations at the international level. Wadmond
argues that "customary international law itself provides that contracts
between a state and a foreigner are binding upon both parties ... it is
beyond dispute that the national law of any state cannot vary its
obligations under international law."' 9 2
3. Specific Performance Creates Stability and Predictability
As a matter of common sense, investors locate their investments in
countries where they find stability, security, and predictability; security
of investment therefore makes an integral part of decision-making
process to invest abroad. This security "vanishes with the violation of
international contracts." 93 The same holds true in regard to other areas
of international law. In relation to the WTO, for instance, some have
argued that "[the] development of pacta sunt servanda into the WTO
treaty system seems to have been slow, but represents a significant step
towards the enhancement of the security and predictability objectives of
the multilateral trading system."l94 Further, the principle of pacta sunt
servanda "may be seen as manifesting the need perceived by states for an
international legal system that can ensure international order and prevent
arbitrary behavior and chaos."1 95
In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the entire investor-
state relationship is built upon trust and confidence considering that "the
investor exposes himself to the host state's legal and factual control over
the investment and relies on the host state to meet its promises it made
189. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351-52 (1935).
190. Id. at 361 n.3.
191. Id. at 353-54.
192. Wadmond, supra note 12, at 182-83.
193. Id. at 181.
194. Yenkong H. Ngangjoh, Pacta Sunt Servanda and Complaints in the WTO Dispute
Settlement, I MANCHESTER J. INT'L EcoN. L. 75, 75 (2004).
195. Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk, The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of
Obligation Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513, 514 (1989).
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before investing." 96 If the host state breaches its obligations, this trustful
relationship will likely be diminished or destroyed. Therefore, holding
the state responsible for meeting its obligations in kind as a result of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda might restore this diminished or
destroyed trust and confidence. Therefore, at least theoretically, the more
trust and confidence the host state gains the more investment it will
attract.19 7 One can argue that trust and confidence cannot be increased
unless one attaches huge significance to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and the primary effect of the breach of this principle which is
an aggrieved party's right to specific performance. Endicott nicely argues
that "protecting contractual and treaty rights is widely seen as essential
to the encouragement of foreign direct investment and stable and
functional economy in general."l98 In his account, "unless investors can
be confident that their agreements will be honored, they face considerably
greater risks in making their investment and may therefore decide against
doing so."l 9 9 It therefore seems that an express provision in an investment
contract or a treaty providing that the primary effect of the breach of
obligations shall be the other party's right to choose performance will
serve the function of assuring the investors of an investment-friendly
environment in the host country.
4. Specific Performances Accords with the Nature of Long-
Term Agreements
Specific performance as an immediate effect of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda ppears to be an effective remedy for agreements involving
a continuing relationship as is the case in all investment contexts; the
WTO experience also highlights contracts involving an ongoing
relationship as an example of circumstances in which the use of non-
pecuniary relief may be most effective.2 00 Specific performance may
prove to be particularly effective if the circumstances of the dispute
indicate that there is a high chance of continuation of a friendly
relationship between an investor and a host state.20 1 This might be the
196. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, Umbrella Clauses as Public Law Concepts in Comparative
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIc LAW 322 (Stephan
W. Schill ed., 2011).
197. Azubuike, supra note 185, at 176 (arguing that "international relations are enhanced
when States, in their dealings with each other, have the comfort and assurance that whatever
agreement they enter into will be respected by each party. Thus, pacta sunt servanda is trust-
constitutive").
198. Endicott, supra note 52, at 548.
199. Id.
200. Brooks E. Allen, The Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Lessons for Arbitral Practitioners, in ASA PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY 283 (Michael E.
Schneider & Joachim Knoll eds., 2011).
201. Elizabeth Whitsitt & Nigel Bankes, The Evolution ofInternational Investment Law and
35
Dizgovin: Foundations of Specific Performance in Investor-State Dispute Set
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
case, for instance, in situations where the host state's actions violating
treaty or contractual obligations has been taken unintentionally.202 Maybe
taking into account of this fact Schreuer observes that "it is likely that in
the future more cases will arise, involving disputes stemming from
ongoing relationships, in which awards providing for specific
performance or injunctions will become relevant."2 03 Schreuer's
prediction came true in 2013 in the case of Arif In this case, the tribunal
held that
the general position in international law is that the injured State
may elect between the available forms of reparation and may
prefer compensation to restitution. On the other hand, restitution is
more consistent with the objectives of bilateral investment treaties,
as it preserves both the investment and the relationship between
the investor and the Host State.204
The interesting aspect of this case lies in the fact that unlike many
other cases in which states refuse to perform their obligations in kind, in
this case it was the state that insisted on performing its obligations in kind
by way of restitution. In fact, the responded asked the tribunal
were [it] to decide that Moldova bears responsibility for the
cancellation of the Airport Lease Agreement, Moldova stands by
its request for 60 days to determine if it can provide some form of
restitution, for example by arranging signature of a new lease
agreement with Le Bridge in conformity with applicable law, in
lieu of whatever damages the tribunal might determine.2 05
Furthermore, in some investment sectors such as investment in the
international energy industry, it appears that states themselves attach
great importance to keeping the relationship intact. Professor Peter
Cameron points out that many disputes in the international energy
industry are settled before the court or arbitral tribunal renders the final
award which reflects the significance of "both commercial realities and
the need to preserve a long-term relationship between the investor and
Its Application to the Energy Center, 51 ALBERTA L. REV. 207, 239 (2013).
202. JARVIN SIGVARD, Non-Pecuniary Remedies: The Practice of Declaratory Relief and
Specific Performance in International Commercial Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 167-68 (Arthur W. Rovine
ed., 2008).
203. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 179, at
1138 (2d ed. 2009).
204. Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/23, Award 1570 (Apr. 8, 2013).
205. Id. ¶ 568.
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the host state."206 Based on this fact, it might not be unreasonable to make
the assumption that whenever host state benefits from the continuation of
the relationship, it does not come up with defenses it could have used
otherwise. Consequently, it is obviously against the principle of good
faith to come up with a sovereignty defense where the host state does not
consider the continuation of the relationship beneficial. There should be
no doubt that the principle of good faith could prohibit such a behavior
by forcing the host state to specifically perform its obligations and thus
to stick to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.207
The case of Nykomb v. Latvia20 8 best exemplifies the effect of bad
faith on the part of the host state. In that case the tribunal held "even if
damage or losses to an investment may be inflicted indirectly through
loss creating actions toward a subsidiary in the country of a Contracting
State, restitution must primarily be seen as an appropriate remedy in a
situation where a contracting state has instituted actions directly against
the investor."209 The case implies that where the host state takes actions
in bad faith, it could justify the investor's right to specific performance
since when states make treaties and thus assume obligations and obtain
rights, they must employ their rights in accordance with the purposes and
principles of international law and "without prejudice to the legitimate
interest and rights of other subjects of that law." 2 10
The principle of good faith, as a basis for specific performance of a
contract or a treaty, may also come into play in situations where a state
expressly deprives itself of a right to nationalize their contracts. George
W. Haight argues that according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
states must comply with their contracts in good faith.2 11 He goes on and
206. PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY, 1 1.126 (2010).
207. The principle of good faith is also well established in international law as well as
international investment law. International treaties, case law, and scholarship unanimously
acknowledge the paramount importance of the principle of good faith in international law. It is a
principle from which other principles such as the principle of pacta sunt servanda nd other legal
rules related to honesty, fairness, and reasonableness have been derived. In international
investment law, substantive standards of protection such as "fair and equitable treatment," "full
protection and security," "protection of legitimate expectations," "transparency," and "non-
discrimination" are also based on the principle of good faith. See, e.g., Munir Maniruzzaman, The
Concept of Good Faith in International Investment Disputes - The Arbitrator's Dilemma,
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/04/30/the-concept-of-good-
faith-in-intemational-investment-disputes-the-arbitrators-dilemma-2/; Todd J. Grierson & Weiler
Ian A Laird, Standards of Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 272 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); Tdcnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003).
208. Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, Award of Dec. 16, 2003.
209. Id. § 5.1.
210. Lukashuk, supra note 195, at 514.
211. George W. Haight, The Internationalization of Development Contracts, 3 PUB. L.
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states "although like other property these contracts can be lawfully
nationalized upon the payment of adequate compensation, governments
in the exercise of their sovereignty can divest themselves of the right to
nationalize their contracts. If despite such divestment the government
nevertheless purports to nationalize, the principle of restitutio integrim
would apply and a tribunal could order specific performance or
damages."212
5. Specific Performance does not Violate States' Sovereignty
States and arbitral tribunals have argued that specific performance is
against a state's sovereignty. However, specific performance does not run
counter to the state's sovereignty. In Occidental v. Ecuador, where the
claimant sought provisional measures in relation to Ecuador's
termination of a participation contract for exploration of hydrocarbon
reserves, the tribunal held: "[i]t is well established that where a State has,
in the exercise of its sovereign powers, put an end to a contract or a
license, or any other foreign investor's entitlement, specific performance
must be deemed legally impossible."213 The tribunal went on and held
that
[t]he adequate remedy where an internationally illegal act has been
committed is compensation deemed to be equivalent with
restitution in kind. Such a solution strikes the required balance
between the need to protect the foreign investor's rights and the
right of the host State to claim control over its natural
resources."214
Likewise, in Enron v. Argentina,2 15 Argentina strongly questioned the
tribunal's jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief which would have
prohibited Argentina from collecting taxes.2 16 It particularly argued that
"an ICSID tribunal cannot impede an expropriation that falls exclusively
within the ambit of State sovereignty; that tribunal could only establish
whether there has been an expropriation, its legality or illegality and the
corresponding compensation."217 Nonetheless, States' power and right to
enter into treaties and contracts are an obvious attribute of their
FORUM 69, 78 (1984).
212. Id.
213. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award of Aug.
17, 2007, 179.
214. Id.185.
215. Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Jan. 14, 2014).
216. Aaken, supra note 10, at 747.
217. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, T 76.
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sovereignty. Sovereignty does not exist in a vacuum; "the assumption and
exercise of international legal obligations constitutes a realization of that
sovereignty. By undertaking such obligations, a state acquires not only
duties, but also rights. As a result, its capacity to exercise its sovereignty
in international relations is enhanced."2 18 In fact, when a state makes a
contract with a foreign investor, it makes use of its sovereignty power;2 19
and, thus by exercising its power and right to conclude a contract, it also
assumes responsibility and liability. 2 2 0 One aspect of this liability may be
compelling the state to meet its obligation in kind. Also, some have
argued that the principle of good faith may impose limitations on States'
sovereignty.2 2' In addition, to give huge weight to the concept of
sovereignty would mean that "a state can always violate its commitments
under both treaties and agreements with private individuals, thus making
any agreements the state enters into meaningless and non-binding"222
which is clearly unjust and unreasonable.
Last but not least, the current trend is toward limiting the extreme
manifestations of sovereignty, and toward intensifying the rights of
individuals against the state.2 2 3 This is currently taking place in some
areas of international law specifically the WTO. Anne van Aaken argues
that "international courts clearly issue decisions which make revision of
laws as well as administrative acts necessary and there it is well accepted,
for example in WTO law." 224
III. INEVITABILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE IN ISDS
Despite the silence of most of investment treaties as to the form of
reparation, in practice arbitral tribunals rarely award non-pecuniary
remedies including specific performance in ISDS.22 5 One may explain
218. Lukashuk, supra note 195, at 515.
219. In this regard, PCIJ has declared that "the right of entering into international
engagement is an attribute of state sovereignty." Wadmond, supra note 12, at 179.
220. Id. at 181 (arguing that "with increased government control [over economic activities]
comes increased government responsibility; in a democratic state power imports responsibility.
The contract is the primary instrument of reconciling freedom with responsibility").
221. Steven Reinhold, Good Faith in International Law, BONN RESEARCH PAPERS ON
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW No 2/2013, 17 (May 23, 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract-2269746.
222. Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 287, 325 (1999) (arguing that "if the system of international law had not recognized the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, then that principle would have become legally meaningless and
all agreements reached between States would have been rendered ineffective and non-binding.
Thus, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the basis of
validity of international law").
223. Wadmond, supra note 12, at 179.
224. Aaken, supra note 10, at 749.
225. MICHAEL MCILWRATH & JOHN SAVAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
39
Dizgovin: Foundations of Specific Performance in Investor-State Dispute Set
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
this with the fact that the tribunals consider specific performance as a
sovereignty infringing remedy that is incapable of being enforced in any
effective way.226 In line with this group of cases, Sornarajah argues that
an order for specific performance against a state by an arbitrator is
obviously a futile act as it cannot be enforced in any meaningful way.22 7
The other reason for the scarcity of specific performance in ISDS has to
do with the fact that investors in the vast majority of cases frame their
claims in terms of monetary compensation.22 8 There is no empirical
research, however, to show why investors do not opt for specific
performance. Therefore, the fact that investors do not claim specific
performance in ISDS should not lead one to conclude that investors view
specific performance as an inappropriate remedy, at least, in all
circumstances.
Problems inherent in the enforcement of non-pecuniary remedies may
be one of the major determinative factors in regard to investors'
preference for monetary compensation.2 29 The enforcement problems
may include, among others, difficulty in supervising specific
performance. This is particularly acute in settling disputes through
arbitration since at the time an arbitral tribunal renders its final award its
duty comes to an end; difficulties in forcing a foreign national
government or federal court to adopt a new regulation or law; and
troubles in forcing a private company contracted to work for the
government o change its behavior or offer an apology.
Nonetheless, based on the fact that most investment treaties do not set
out the forms of reparation, most scholars approve of the tribunals power
to award non-pecuniary remedies in ISDS unless an investment treaty
expressly exclude it.230 Focusing on the current literature, the following
MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 319 (2010) (noting that "although [arbitral tribunals usually]
have the power to award specific performance, in practice arbitral tribunals are reluctant to do so,
especially where such an award will be difficult to enforce").
226. See, e.g., Occidental v. Ecuador, IT 78, 84 (Provisional Measures, Aug. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.italaw.com/ sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0576.pdf; Amco Asia
Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, T 202 (Nov. 20, 1984), available at
http://www.italaw.com/cases/347; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 341 (2007); BONNITCHA, supra note 163, at 60.
227. See generally M. SORNARAJA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
LAW, 280 (3th ed. 2010).
228. Hindelang, supra note 36, at 9; Christoph H. Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in
ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT'L 325, 329 (2004).
229. Allen, supra note 200, at 294 (noting that the "preference for damages often reflects
practical considerations, such as the difficulty of obtaining restitution of property that has already
been liquidated. Moreover, the filing of investor-state arbitration often signals the end of the
relationship between the parties; investors may fear that they can no longer operate in what is
perceived to be a hostile environment").
230. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 570; BONNITCHA, supra note 163, at 59-60 (noting that
"the prevailing view is that tribunals adjudicating investor-state disputes under investment treaties
do have the inherent authority to award non-pecuniary remedies"); Whitsitt & Bankes, supra note
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paragraphs seek to shed some light on the circumstances in which an
order for specific performance in ISDS may be inevitable and desirable
and proposes two ways namely "change of remedy" and "accumulation
of remedies" to accomplish the goal of awarding specific performance in
ISDS and giving full effect to the principle of full compensation. Having
specified the mentioned circumstances, this Article shall first examine the
doctrines of "change of remedy" and "accumulation of remedies" under
the PICC in order to shed some light on the doctrines in international
investment law. Finally it will address the doctrines in international
investment law focusing on the ILC Articles and case law.
A. Circumstances Making Specific Performance an Inevitable and
Desirable Remedy
Brooks E. Allen in an article entitled "The Use of Non-pecuniary
Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement: Lessons for Arbitral
Practitioners" strives to transfer the approach of WTO toward remedies
to other areas of law including ISDS. He points out that although there
are huge differences between the WTO systems on the one hand and
commercial and investor-state arbitration on the other, however, the
WTO may provide arbitral practitioners with valuable lessons with
respect o the appropriateness of non-pecuniary remedies.2 3 1 He identifies
circumstances under which non-pecuniary remedies may prove to be
appropriate and effective. He also proposes some solutions for the
enforcement problem of non-pecuniary remedies.23 2 In his view, damages
are inadequate remedies because in some circumstance it is impossible to.
quantify them.2 33 He gives the example of a treaty violation by a state in
which the state refuses to permit foreign nationals to assume management
positions in an investor's company.2 34 He concludes that in such a
situation, one cannot quantify the sustained damages and thus "the most
effective remedy would be an order that required the State to permit
201, at 237 (noting that "in investment arbitration, reparation made to investors for breaches of
IIAs almost always comes in the form of compensation. However, non-pecuniary remedies like
restitution (that is, specific performance or an injunction) are part of the spectrum of remedies
available to foreign investors"); McLAcHLAN ET AL., supra note 226, ¶ 9.112 (pointing out that
"to date, the remedy awarded by almost all tribunals has been the payment of monetary
compensation. Yet this past practice should not obscure the fact that tribunals have the power to
be much more flexible in their choice of remedy."); Latham & Watkins, Non-Pecuniary Remedies
in Investment Arbitration Against Sovereigns, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE
1 (2009), https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/arbitrationpub
26991 .pdf
231. Allen, supra note 200, at 283.
232. Addressing the solutions for the enforcement of non-pecuniary remedies is beyond the
scope of this study.
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foreign managers to assume positions in the company."235 He continues
and puts forward that non-pecuniary remedies may also be useful
remedies compared to damages award in situations where monetary
compensation are grounded in lost profits.2 3 6 He refers to the fact that
"the often speculative nature of lost profits claims may render tribunals
reluctant to grant them, particularly in the investor-state context if the
investment is relatively new or untested."2 3 7 From his point of view "an
order to return property, or perform contractual obligations, may not only
provide a more effective remedy, but may also pose fewer
methodological difficulties than a damages award, and thereby avoid a
costly and protracted battle of experts."238
Martin Endicott in an article with the title of "Remedies in Investor-
State Arbitration: Restitution, Specific Performance and Declaratory
Awards" examines the availability of non-pecuniary remedies in ISDS in
the light of the ILC Articles. He states that the ILC Articles may be a
great source of guidance in regard to the availability of non-pecuniary
remedies in ISDS; at the same time, he cautions that one must be very
careful in applying the ILC Articles to ISDS analogously.23 9
Relying on three hypothetical scenarios, he elegantly illustrates
circumstances under which monetary damages may not compensate an
investor's losses. We mention one of those scenarios as an example here.
He illustrates a situation in which
a foreign investor, an engineering company, sets up a factory in
country A to manufacture electricity generating turbines. The
factory is in the process of manufacturing a turbine for an
important new client. Some weeks before it is shipped, a revolution
takes place in country A. A detachment of troops arrives at the
factory gates and their commander reports that the new
Government has passed a decree nationalizing certain foreign
businesses and confiscating their property which, of course,
includes the turbine. Most of the foreign investor's staff are
escorted to the airport but the Research and Development (R&D)
manager is told that he is not permitted to leave and must continue
living at his local residence until further notice. The turbines are
unique and, if they are not delivered there is no telling how much
damage will be caused to the project in country B and how many
235. Id
236. Id. at 300.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Endicott, supra note 52, at 517.
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present and future clients the investor is likely to lose.240
He points out that although it will be possible to quantify the sustained
damages in relation to the seizure of the plant, however calculation of the
potential damages with regard to the turbines and detained manager will
not be possible because of the unique nature of both of them which makes
a damages award an inadequate remedy in this situation.241 Finally, he
proposes some standards that arbitrators must take into account in
deciding to grant or reject non-pecuniary remedies; they are:
proportionality,24 2 sanctity of contract, state sovereignty, consistency,
sustainable development, inadequacy of compensation, and inadequacy
of enforcement capability.243
Carole Malinvaud in a paper entitled "Non-pecuniary Remedies in
Investment Treaty and Commercial Arbitration" addresses the
availability of non-pecuniary remedies in both commercial and investor-
state arbitration. Focusing on the concept of remedies which is defined as
"the means of enforcing the right or preventing or redressing a wrong,"
she comes to the conclusion that remedies both in commercial and
investor-state disputes are not confined to monetary compensation.244 She
also gives examples of situations where monetary compensation will not
be an adequate remedy. In her view, this may be the case where "a party
suffers moral damage, when the honour or the reputation of the party is
at stake."24 5 She states that in such situation "money would probably be
less satisfactory than a full apology or public acknowledgement of
libel." 246 She concludes with the proposition that non-pecuniary remedies
may be available in ISDS subject to the satisfaction of two conditions:
firstly the conditions provided in ILC Articles are to be met and secondly,
states show willingness to abide by the measure ordered.247
With respect to the appropriateness of non-pecuniary remedies in
ISDS, Surya P Subedi also argues that "it is conceivable that in many
cases the foreign investors concerned, especially large multinational
enterprises or those taking a longer-term approach to investment in the
development of the infrastructure or the exploitation of natural resources
240. Id. at 518.
241. Id. at 519.
242. Proportionality means that "the nature of remedy should be proportionate to the harm
caused by breach. For instance, restitution should not be ordered where it will result in a burden
disproportionate to the benefit that is obtained by requiring restitution rather than compensation."
Id at 548.
243. Id. at 547-50.
244. CAROLE MAINVAUD, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty and Commercial
Arbitration, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 208 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
2009).
245. Id. at 209.
246. Id
247. Id. at 229.
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in the country concerned, would be quite satisfied with a promise of
cessation, non-repetition, revocation or modification of the wrongful
measures concerned on the part of the host state rather than the payment
of monetary damages as such."2 48 Above all, it seems that in some
circumstances such as "debt-for-nature swap" investment only specific
performance of obligations will be an adequate remedy. 249
These studies unearth some crucial facts. There are certainly situations
where non-pecuniary remedies including specific performance will be
more appropriate in terms of making whole the losses arising from a
breach of an obligation and other implications they may have on the entire
society; for instance, where the quantification of damages becomes
impossible or the host state simply does not pay damages. Also there are
situations where it will be desirable to award specific performance in
ISDS, such as where the host state itself insist on specific performance
and there is a high chance of continuation of a friendly relationship
between an investor and the host state.
The Article has proposed two mechanisms, namely "change of
remedy" and "accumulation of remedies" in order to deal with situations
where monetary damages turn to be inadequate remedy or granting
specific performance will be desirable compared to damages claim.
B. "Change ofRemedy" and "Accumulation ofRemedies"
This Part will address "accumulation of remedies" and "change of
remedy" under both the PICC and investment law. The rationale behind
both is to fully compensate an aggrieved party. However, accumulation
of remedies and change of remedy must not lead to overcompensation.
Taking into account the fact that investment treaties and international law
do not expressly set out any rule to this effect, this Article will first
examine the approach of the PICC in order to give an insight regarding
to the issue. Outside of the PICC, we might look into several other
sources of law such as the Principle of European Contract Law (PECL),
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to confirm and
supplement the approach of the PICC. However, they are not the main
focus of this Article. Although in some circumstances an order for
specific performance might serve the interests of an aggrieved party
better than monetary compensations, nonetheless, occasionally specific
performance may not make whole all of an aggrieved party's losses
arising from breach of a contract since there is usually a delay in the time
in which the contract should have been performed and the time it is
248. SURYA P SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 218 (2008).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
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actually executed. This leads to the question "should an aggrieved party
rely on other remedies besides specific performance?" ("accumulation of
remedies"). The assumption of accumulation of remedies may occur in
regard to all available remedies. However, this Part will only address
accumulation of specific performance with damages claim.
Moreover, an aggrieved party who has already demanded specific
performance might later find it an inappropriate remedy. For instance,
performance may become impossible due to circumstances which have
arisen after the order to perform. This also leads to the question "should
an aggrieved party invoke another remedy?"("change of remedy"). The
assumption of change of remedy may also take place in regard to all
available remedies. However, this Part will only deal with change of
remedy in relation to specific performance and damages claim which
itself could take two forms: (1) where the aggrieved party decides to
change from specific performance to a damages claim and (2) when the
aggrieved party decides to change from a damages claim to specific
performance.
The accumulation aspect of the principle of full compensation on its.
face does not reinforce an aggrieved party's right to specific performance
since when one speaks of accumulation of specific performance with a
damages claim; it means that the aggrieved party has already obtained an
order for specific performance. Therefore, what we want to establish, has
already been accomplished. Nonetheless, the accumulation of specific
performance with a damages claim may play a crucial role in
consolidating the aggrieved party's right to specific performance in the
sense that it provides a safeguard against those who might argue that
specific performance is not an appropriate remedy because it does not
fully compensate the aggrieved party. Therefore, by recognizing the
possibility of the accumulation of specific performance with damages
claim such possible arguments become irrelevant.
Where the change of remedy aspect of the principle of full
compensation is concerned, an aggrieved party might decide to shift from
specific performance to damages and vice versa. Again, a shift from
specific performance to damages does not prima facie reinforce the right
to specific performance since like the previous case the aggrieved party
has already obtained an order for specific performance. However,
considering that it makes specific performance a flexible remedy, it
overcomes the undesirability of specific performance in situations such
as where the enforcement of the contract becomes impossible after the
aggrieved party has obtained an order for specific performance. On the
other hand, the shift from damages claim to specific performance is
highly relevant to establish the theoretical foundation of specific
45
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performance. This might be particularly pertinent in ISDS.2 5 0
C. Accumulation ofRemedies: Specific Performance and
Damages Claims
As far as the possibility of combining the remedies is concerned, most
domestic legal systems neither explicitly reject nor embrace it.25 1 There
are, of course, some legal systems that expressly reject25 2 or accept253 the
possibility of accumulation of remedies. At the international and regional
level, however, almost all advanced instruments such as the PICC, the
CISG, the PECL,2 54 and the DCFR25 5 allow accumulation of remedies as
far as they are compatible with each other. An immediate reason
accounting for an aggrieved party's right to combine the available
remedies has to do with the fact that, in some circumstances, an order for
specific performance may not make whole all of an aggrieved party's
losses arising from breach of a contract.
Although the CISG does not set forth a specific provision for the
purpose of accumulation of remedies, nevertheless, as many scholars
have noted, various provisions of the CISG, especially Articles 45(2) and
61(2), confirm the possibility of combining remedies under the CISG.2 5 6
250. See below "change of remedy" in international investment law.
251. E.g., the Iranian civil code neither explicitly sets out any rule regarding accumulation
of remedies nor rejects it. Scholarship, however, has filled this gap and recognized the possibility
of combining remedies under the Iranian law. See, e.g., Shoarian & Rahimi, supra note 7, at 735;
HOSSEIN SAFAEI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 157 (4th ed., Publ'n of Univ. of Tehran,
2013) (translation is in Persian).
252. The Civil Code of Germany (BGB) presumably rejects the possibility of combining
remedies since the BGB 325 and 326 "give the aggrieved party the choice between damages and
'termination,' and thus it is often said that the aggrieved party cannot both 'terminate' and claim
damages for non-performance." Lando & Beale, supra note 7, at 363; COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES OF LAW THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 231 (C.M. Bianca & M.J.
Bonell eds., Giuffre 1987) (noting that "some national laws, such as the English, German and
Hungarian Ones, do not allow combining the remedy of avoidance of a contract with an action
for damages").
253. E.g., article 6:277 of the Dutch Civil Code expressly provides that a creditor who has
terminated a synallagmatic contract may ask for damages under the contract. Study Group on a
European Civil Code, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft
Common Frame ofReference (DCFR) at 802 n.1 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2008), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law en.pdf; Article 159(1) of
Libyan Civil Code sets forth "bilateral contracts .... if one of the parties does not perform his
obligation, the other party may demand the performance of the contract or its rescission." Mahdi
Zahraa & Aburima Abdullah Chith, Specific Performance in the Light of the CJSG, the
UNIDROIT Principles and Libyan Law, 7 UNIF. L. REV. 751, 766 n. 110 (2002).
254. Principles of European Contract Law art. 8.102 (2002), available at http://www.
transnational.deusto.es/emttl/documentos/Principles%20ofP/20European%20Contract%20Law.
pdf.
255. Study Group on a European Civil Code, Draft Common Frame of Reference, at 238,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr outline-edition en.pdf.
256. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, at 699 T 25 (noting that "Article 45 (2)
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Article 45(2) reads "the buyer is not deprived of any right he may have
to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies."257 Similarly,
Article 61(2) provides "the seller is not deprived of any right he may have
to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies."258
Like the CISG, the PICC does not set out a specific provision on this
matter. However, one can infer an aggrieved party's right to accumulate
remedies from different provisions scattered over the PICC. Article
7.1.4(3), (4), and (5) on the right to cure, Article 7.1.5(2) on the additional
period for performance, Article 7.3.5 on termination, and Article 7.4.1 on
damages are highly relevant for this purpose.259 For example, Article
7.1.4(5) reads "notwithstanding cure, the aggrieved party retains the right
to claim damages for delay as well as for any harm caused or not
prevented by cure." Furthermore, Article 7.3.5 (2) sets forth "termination
does not preclude a claim for damages for non-performance."260 The
official comment to Article 7.1.1 of the PICC also acknowledges this
conclusion. It states "the assumption underlying the Principles is that all
remedies which are not logically inconsistent may be cumulated."261 It,
however, fails to specify which remedies are logically consistent and
which are not.262
The approach of the PECL and the DCFR is more clear and organized
compared to the approach of the CISG and PICC because they explicitly
set out a provision with regard to accumulation of remedies. For example,
Article 8:102 of the PECL provides "remedies which are not
incompatible may be cumulated. In particular, a party is not deprived of
its right to damages by exercising its right to any other remedy."263 The
DCFR in Article III.-3:102 employs exactly the same language as the
PECL.
Accumulation of remedies is not unlimited, though. The general rule
is that an aggrieved party cannot accumulate incompatible or inconsistent
provides that the buyer has the right to combine a claim for damage with the remedies available
to him under Article 45(1)(a) and 46 to 52"); Jarno Vanto, Remedy ofReduction ofPrice: Remarks
on the Manner in Which the Principles of European Contract Law may be Used to Interpret or
Supplement Article 50 of the CISG, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1980)
AS UNIFORM LAw 413 n.8 (John Felemegas ed., 2007); HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 406.
257. CISG art. 45(2), available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/
V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
258. Id. art. 61(2).
259. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 4, at 729.
260. UNIDROIT Principles 2010 art. 7.3.5(2).
261. Official Comment art. 7.1.1, UNIDROIT Principles 2010, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles20l0/integralversionprinciples20
10-e.pdf.
262. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAlP, supra note 9, 12, at 809.
263. See Lando & Beale, supra note 7, at 362.
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remedies.2 6 4 In determining what remedies are inconsistent, one needs to
explore the relationship between different remedies. For instance, an
aggrieved party cannot claim its right to specific performance and at the
same time terminate the contract.265
However, specific performance and damages claims are, as a general
principle, compatible remedies. Therefore, a claim for specific
performance is consistent with damages for delay or other consequential
damages on the grounds of delay in performance.2 66 It seems that the only
restriction stems from the principle of full compensation. One aspect of
this principle is that an aggrieved party must not be overcompensated.2 67
Consequently, where the aggrieved party gets the very performance
contracted for, he should not also be compensated for the value of the
defaulting party's promise.268 In fact, "an action for performance is
incompatible with a claim for full damages, that is, damages that replace
the performance."269
D. Change of Remedy
Change of remedy is another means to achieve the goal of full
compensation. It has generally to do with the question whether an
aggrieved party may shift from first invoked remedy to another remedy.
If an aggrieved party, for instance, has first demanded specific
performance, may he shift to damages claim later and vice versa? Or, if
an aggrieved party has first demanded specific performance, may he
change his mind later and resort to termination? Answering these
questions, first and foremost, require determining the applicable law to
the dispute. At national level, most legal regimes do not expressly provide
any rules in regard to change of remedy.2 7 0 The same holds true in relation
to most regional and international instruments such as the CISG,271
264. See, e.g., first sentence of Article 8:102 of the PECL which provides "remedies which
are not incompatible may be cumulated." Id. at 362.
265. Id. at 363.
266. HONNOLD, supra note 7, at 406; VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, at
729.
267. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, at 699 (noting that "the scope of claim for
damages differs depending upon the remedy to which it is linked. The general principle is that
cumulative damages cannot be permitted to lead to overcompensation of the buyer").
268. Id.
269. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, 17, at 729.
270. Indian law "generally allows for free shifting between different remedies until a court
has passed a judgment ordering performance of the contract"; LARS MEYER, NON-PERFORMANCE
AND REMEDIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES AND INDIAN CONTRACT LAW:
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, AND INDIAN STATUTORY CONTRACT
LAW 134 (2010).
271. Despite the fact that the CISG does not expressly set out rules for change of remedy,
however this can be inferred from other provisions of the CISG. Articles 47 and 63 of the CISG
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PECL,27 2 and DCFR.27 3 The PICC is the only international instrument
that explicitly sets out rules regarding change of remedy.
Article 7.2.5(1) of the PICC reads "an aggrieved party who has
required performance of a non-monetary obligation and who has not
received performance within a period fixed or otherwise within a
reasonable period of time may invoke any other remedy." Article 7.2.5(2)
also provides "where the decision of a court for performance of a non-
monetary obligation cannot be enforced, the aggrieved party may invoke
any other remedy." The Article seemingly has limited the possibility of
change of remedy to situations where an aggrieved party has first
demanded specific performance. However, as literature confirms, it is
also applicable to situations where an aggrieved party has first invoked
other remedies such as termination and damages claims and then shifted
to specific performance.2 74 This Part, nonetheless, will only address the
relationship between specific performance and damages claims in two
different situations. First, when an aggrieved party has already demanded
damages claims and then shifted to specific performance and second
where an aggrieved party has already relied upon specific performance
and later changes his mind in favor of a damages claim.
which respectively give a right to a buyer and a seller to fix an additional time for a defaulting
party to perform his obligations are especially relevant. Article 47(1), for instance, after
establishing such a right, in article 47(2) sets down "unless the buyer has received notice from the
seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period,
resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of any
right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance." This paragraph provides that
during the additional time period, which enables a defaulting party to meet his obligation, the
buyer would not be able to resort any other remedy including termination and damages claims. In
fact, granting an additional time excludes the remedies referred to in Article 45(1) of the CISG.
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, ¶ 14, at 730. However, once the additional time
expires, the buyer will be able to invoke other remedies subject to the satisfaction of their
requirements. For instance, if the seller does not meet his obligations to repair the goods during
the additional period, the buyer will be able to terminate the contract if the delivery of non-
conforming goods amounts to a fundamental breach in the meaning of article 25 of the CISG.
Under certain circumstances, such as where a defaulting party declares that he will not perform
within the fixed additional period or where a seller commits further breach during the additional
period that justify an immediate avoidance ofthe contract, an aggrieved party will be able to resort
other remedies even before the expiration of the additional time. Id. ¶ 15, at 730-31.
272. In spite of the fact that Article 8:102 of the PICC does not expressly set out possibility
for change of remedy, however official comment C states that "Article 8:102 does not preclude
an aggrieved party which has elected one remedy from shifting to another later, even though the
later remedy is incompatible with the first elected." Lando & Beale, supra note 7, at 363.
273. Official comment C to Article 111-3:102 of the DCFR by using the same language as
the PECL provides "however, a creditor who has chosen one remedy is not precluded from
shifting to another later, even though the later remedy is incompatible with the first elected."
Study Group on a European Civil Code, supra note 253, at 802.
274. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, 12, at 809.
49
49
Dizgovin: Foundations of Specific Performance in Investor-State Dispute Set
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Change from Specific Performance to Damages Claim
A shift from specific performance to damages claim might be useful
in some situations. The performance of the contract might become
ineffective because of its dependency on the cooperation by the other
275 tecnrc
party. Furthermore, the performance of the contract might become
impossible after an aggrieved party obtains an order for specific
performance.2 7 6 Additionally, an aggrieved party may simply change his
mind in favor of other remedies like damages claims and termination.2 7 7
If, for instance, an aggrieved party who has already obtained an order for
specific performance comes to know that a defaulting party is unwilling
or unable to perform, he might effectively shift from specific
performance to damages claims. A shift from specific performance to
damages claim per se does not reinforce the existence of specific
performance; however given that it makes specific performance a flexible
remedy it should be taken for granted.
2. Change from Damages Claim to Specific Performance
In contrast to the previous assumption, a shift from damages claims to
specific performance seems unlikely in practice. However, it might be the
case in situations where calculation of damages proves to be very difficult
or impossible2 7 8 as it is usually the case with regard to long term
contracts. Furthermore, an aggrieved party who has already claimed
damages might shift to specific performance coming to know that he will
face serious problems finding substitute performance. The shift from
damages to specific performance will be particularly relevant in ISDS.2 7 9
An aggrieved party's right to change his remedy, however, is not
absolute. The principles of good faith and fair dealing might impose
limitations on the aggrieved party's right to change remedy if it disturbs
the interests of the non-performing party.2 8 0 This might be the case "if the
275. Id. T 1, at 809.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. SIGVARD, supra note 202, at 167 (arguing that "specific performance is ordinarily
granted where the remedy in the form of money damages is inappropriate because it is either
inadequate or impractical. Several elements may be taken into account to find a satisfactory
substitute to monetary compensation: the difficulty of proving damages and the difficulty of
collecting damages").
279. See below "change of remedy" in international investment law.
280. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, 1 3, at 810; SCHLECHTRIEM &
SCHWENZER, supra note 9, ¶ 15, at 695.
[I]n exceptional cases, a change from an initially asserted right to require
performance to another remedy can be a misuse of rights. This would apply, for
instance, in case of a fundamental breach of contract if the buyer initially insists
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non-performing party relied upon the exercise of a particular remedy."281
For example, if an aggrieved party has already demanded specific
performance and then decides to shift to damages claims, the principle of
good faith and fair dealing will prohibit him from doing so, if, for
instance, "the non-performing party has already invested a great deal of
effort and/or incurred expenses in preparing its performance."282
Furthermore, if an aggrieved party fixes an additional time for a non-
performing party to perform his obligations, the aggrieved party cannot
invoke other remedies during that period.2 8 3
E. "Change ofRemedy" and "Accumulation ofRemedies" in
International Investment Law
Neither international law in general nor international investment law
in particular make an explicit reference to the doctrines of "change of
remedy" and "accumulation of remedies." Nonetheless, one can infer the
same principles in international law as well as international investment
law relying on the principle of full compensation, which is the underlying
reason accounting for the doctrines of "change of remedy" and
"accumulation of remedies," and the principle of good faith. It is clear
that this Part cannot address all aspects of the principle of full
compensation. Rather our main purpose is to establish whether the
principle of full compensation exists in international investment law or
not. The ILC Articles may also provide constructive guidance on
accumulation of remedies and change of remedy in ISDS. In order to
address the issue, it is, first and foremost, necessary to deal with the
relevance of the ILC Articles to ISDS and the principle of full
compensation in international investment law.
Therefore, this Part will first address the relevance of the ILC Articles
to ISDS and then turn to deal with the principle of full compensation in
international investment law. Subsequently, it will examine the
accumulation of remedies and change of remedy in the light of the ILC
Articles, the principle of full compensation, and the principle of good
faith. This Part will address the issue of accumulation of remedies and
change of remedy only with regard to the relationship of specific
performance and damages claim.
on delivery and then changes to a remedy on short notice, although the seller has
already effected the delivery in the meantime. If delivery is made before the
buyer declares the avoidance of the contract, the right of the buyer to avoidance
of the contract is excluded pursuant to Article 7(1) (good faith).
Id.
281. VOGENAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 3, at 809.
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1. The Relevance of the ILC Articles for the Purpose of Extraction of
the Doctrines of "Change of Remedy" and
"Accumulation of Remedies"
The ILC Articles, as their name indicate, deal with responsibility of
states for international wrongful acts and are thus not formally applicable
to investor-state dispute settlement.
As far as it is concerned, the applicability of the ILC Articles to ISDS,
Articles 33(2) and 55 of the ILC Articles, however, shed some light on
the issue. In accordance with Article 33(2), the general principles of state
responsibility are "without prejudice to any right, arising from the
international responsibility of a state, which may accrue directly to any
person or entity other than a state." This means that "primary rules
creating obligations to non-state actors can have their own set of
obligations, among others, on the form of reparation. "284 Article 55 of the
ILC Articles also sets forth "these articles do not apply where and to the
extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful
act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of
a State are governed by special rules of international law."
Consequently, where a particular investment treaty, for instance,
contains specific rules regarding the available remedies, the ILC Articles
cannot be used to ISDS. For example, as NAFTA in Article 1135
prioritize compensatory relief and limits the scope of restitution, one
cannot use the ILC Articles, which favors restitution, in order to interpret
rules of remedies in NAFTA since specific rules take precedence over
general rules of the ILC Articles.285
Taking account of the fact that the ILC Articles are not formally
applicable to ISDS, there is thus no consensus among scholars as to the
applicability of the ILC Articles to ISDS.286 The better view has been
pointed out by Endicott. He argues that although the ILC Articles are not
formally applicable to ISDS, however there is no better source of
guidance for the law of remedies in international law than the ILC
Articles. 287 In his view, if the investor-state tribunals disregarded the
application of the ILC Articles analogously to ISDS they "would be
ignoring a valuable tool to promote clarity in international law of
remedies."288
Furthermore, this Article is not just about examining which
investment treaty allows the availability of specific performance so one
can make use of the ILC Articles in order to fill gaps in the investment
284. Hindelang, supra note 36, at 8.
285. Id. at 9.
286. See Cour Permanente De Justice Internationale, supra note 37.
287. Endicott, supra note 52, at 531.
288. Id.; see also Gisele, supra note 71, at 667.
52 [Vol. 28
52
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss1/1
2016] FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMEN7S
treaty or which treaty does not approve of the availability of specific
performance, therefore one cannot employ the ILC Articles as a gap-
filler. On the other hand, this Article will argue that based on some policy
considerations and practical necessities, specific performance must be
available to an aggrieved party in ISDS regardless of what the current
situation is. Consequently, for the purpose of this study it does not matter
whether an investment treaty allows or disallows specific performance
and subsequently whether the ILC Articles can be used to fill the gaps in
a specific investment treaty. For the purpose of this study, the ILC
Articles serve the function of shedding some light on the possibility of
accumulation of remedies and change of remedy in international law that
can be or more accurately should be transported into ISDS in some
circumstances. In addition, Articles 33(2) and 55 of the ILC Articles
imply that where an investment treaty as an example of instruments
creating primary obligations such as fair and equitable treatment do not
provide specific rules with regard to the form of reparation, the ILC
Articles can be applied to fill the existing gaps in the treaty.
2. The Principle of Full Compensation in International Investment Law
The principle of full compensation lies at the heart of international
law.289 The PCIJ restated this principle in the Chorzow case as "reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed
if that act had not been committed."290 The ILC Articles have codified
this principle in Article 31(1). It reads "the responsible State is under an
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act." Likewise, Article 36(2) states "The
compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including
loss of profits insofar as it is established." The function of the principle
of full compensation is to put an aggrieved party or injured state in as
good a position as it would have been had the contract been fully
performed or the wrongful act had not been committed.2 9 1
When it comes to ISDS, one must differentiate between compensation
for a (legal) expropriation or termination and damages for an illegal act
or termination. Regarding the former, BITs and multilateral investment
treaties diverge as to the standard of compensation. There are, by and
large, two primary approaches. According to one approach,
289. SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
112 (2008) (noting that "full compensation has been firmly established, at least in relation to cases
involving wrongful conduct of respondent, as a principle in international law").
290. See Cour Permanente De Justice Internationale, supra note 37.
291. RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 289, at 108 (noting that "the general principle of full
compensation is the same regardless of whether a loss has been suffered as a result of a breach of
contract or breach of international law").
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compensation to foreign investor should be "just and appropriate." In
accordance with this approach, the amount of compensation is lower than
full compensation.
Another approach, that the vast majority of investment treaties, either
bilateral or multilateral treaties follow, require compensation to foreign
investors be "prompt, adequate, and effective."292 It is controversial
whether this language implies full compensation or not. In accordance
with one view, this does not give rise to the conclusion that the
compensation must make whole loses arising from expropriation.2 9 3 On
the other hand, some have put forward that compensation should be
regarded as "full" compensation and the term "full" itself means "prompt,
adequate and effective."294 This conclusion seems to be correct since in
all legal systems, the principle of full compensation has been recognized
as a principle that intends to put the aggrieved party in as good a position
as he would have been had the contract been fully performed and states
cannot change this with regard to their obligations in the international
arena. Therefore, in the context of ISDS the principle of full
compensation or full reparation shall put "the aggrieved party in the
hypothetical position or the situation that it would have assumed in the
absence of the unlawful act."2 9 5
Where the standard of compensation in cases of illegal acts such as
unlawful expropriation or breach of an investment contract by the host
state is concerned, it seems that there is no controversy with regard to the
applicability of the standard of full compensation in calculating the
damages to be awarded to the investor.2 9 6
3. Accumulation of Remedies in International Investment Law
Having determined the relevance of the ILC Articles to ISDS and
proving the existence of the principle of full compensation in ISDS, now
we turn our focus to examining accumulation and change of remedies in
ISDS. The ILC Articles will be the principal source of guidance in this
regard.
The ILC Articles do not expressly speak of the principle of
accumulation of remedies. Nevertheless, some of the provisions of the
292. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 97 (1995).
293. IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 21 (2009).
294. McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 226, at 316-19; SUBEDI, supra note 248, at 80-81
(noting that "it has been argued that such compensation should be regarded as 'full' compensation
and the term 'full' itself means 'prompt, adequate and effective.' Indeed, a vast majority of BITs,
RTAs and FTAs require 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation against all forms of
expropriation").
295. SABAH, supra note 36, at 61-62.
296. MARBOE, supra note 293, T$ 2.72, 2.77, at 29.
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ILC Articles shed some light on the issue. Article 34 (Forms of
Reparation) sets down "full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution,
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter." Article 34 also makes it
clear that full reparation may only be achieved in particular cases by the
combination of different forms of reparation. "297 Among particular cases
where only the combination of remedies may serve the purpose of full
reparation is when a tribunal grants restitution to an injured party. Article
36(1) confirms this by setting out that "the state responsible for an
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the
damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by
restitution."298 The phrase "as such damage is not made good by
restitution"299 clarifies that in some circumstances restitution in itself
cannot make whole all of losses arising from a wrongful act.
The same holds true in the context of ISDS. Thus, for example, "a
mere restoration of an expropriated property to the aggrieved party may
not fully repair the aggrieved party's economic losses. Such losses may,
for example, be in the form of diminution in value of the property,
business interruption, as well as moral damages. In such situations, the
aggrieved party is entitled to recover compensation for all such losses, in
addition to restitution."300
4. Change of Remedy in International Investment Law
When it comes to the principle of change of remedy, one must first of
all be aware of the fact that, as the study of the PICC showed, a shift from
one remedy to another presupposes that an aggrieved party has an option
to choose from the available remedies. The same rule seems to hold true
in international law as well as international investment law. Article
43(2)(b) of the ILC Articles sets forth that an injured state invoking the
responsibility of another state may specify "what form reparation should
take in accordance with the provisions of part two." The official comment
states "in general, an injured state is entitled to elect as between the
available forms of reparation. Thus, it may prefer compensation to the
possibility of restitution, as Germany did in the Factory at Chorzow case,
or as Finland eventually chose to do in its settlement of the passage
through the Great Belt case.30 1 Nonetheless, the ILC Articles do not
expressly lay down the possibility of change of remedy. However, one
297. ILC Articles and Commentaries, supra note 30, at 95 cmt 2.
298. Id. art. 36(1).
299. Id.
300. SABAHI, supra note 36, at 63.
301. ILC Articles and Commentaries, supra note 30, at 120 cmt 6.
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may infer the possibility of change of remedy from Articles 35 and 36 of
the ILC Articles. Article 35 makes restitution the primary remedy
provided that restitution (a) "is not materially impossible" or (b) "does
not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from
restitution instead of compensation." Article 36(1) reads "the state
responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to
compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not
made good by restitution." The final phrase of Article 36(1) ("insofar as
such damage is not made good by restitution") clarifies the relationship
between restitution and compensation.
According to the official commentary, if restitution is unavailable or
inadequate, compensation may take its place or supplement it
respectively.3 0 2 In the words of the commentary, one of the reasons that
may make restitution unavailable is where in accordance with Article
35(a) it is not materially possible.3 0 3 The appearance of the article
indicates that a court or an arbitral tribunal shall take this into account at
the time of rendering the award. If it finds that the restitution is materially
impossible it will not award it, thus compensation will take its place in
accordance with Article 36. Nevertheless, the tribunal may find
restitution materially possible at the time of the award and grant it for the
injured state, however, it subsequently becomes materially impossible.
This leads the question what would happen to the losses of the injured
party. It seems that Article 36 is resilient enough to allow the injured party
to shift from specific performance, which the tribunal already had granted
to him, to a damages claim. The same should also hold true with regard
to a shift from a damages claim to specific performance which might be
particularly relevant in the context of ISDS.
One may also infer the possibility of a change of remedy from Arif
The tribunal's award reflects consideration of some important policy
concerns. Firstly, the claimant requested damages, but the circumstances
of the case indicated that he was not totally against restitution; as the
circumstances of the case imply, his main concern was the likely inability
or unwillingness of the respondent to comply with its obligation
specifically.3 04 Secondly, "the starting point of respondent's position
[was] that the primary form of reparation for internationally wrongful acts
is restitution. Respondent requested that, in the event of the tribunal
finding liability, the possibility of restitution should be investigated as an
alternative to any damages that the Tribunal may award."3 0 5 In the
respondent's view, restitution "would restore the claimant to the position
he would have been in without any violation of the BIT, and also avoids
302. Id at 99 cmt 3.
303. Id.
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the uncertainties of the calculation of damages, including the possibility
of risk free windfall profits."306 Thirdly, the tribunal held that "restitution
is more consistent with the objectives of bilateral investment treaties, as
it preserves both the investment and the relationship between the investor
and the Host State." However, taking into account the fact that the
respondent had not been able to confirm that restitution is possible, and
the tribunal declared that it cannot supervise any restitutionary remedy; it
rendered the final award as follows:
Within a period of no more than sixty days from the date of this
Award Respondent shall make proposals to Claimant for the
restitution of the investment in the airport store, including
proposals as to appropriate guarantees for the legality of a new
lease agreement;3 07
Claimant may elect to accept or reject the restitution offered by
Respondent at any time within a period of ninety days from the
date of this Award;308
If Claimant elects to accept restitution, Respondent shall pay to
Claimant by way of damages for its breaches of the BIT in relation
to the airport store the sum of MDL 6,565,429;309
If Claimant elects to reject restitution, or if for any reason
Respondent fails to make proposals to Claimant within the sixty
days referred to in (d) above, then Respondent shall pay damages
of MDL 35,136,294.310
In spite of the fact that there is no available information pertaining to
whether the respondent proposed an appropriate way of restitution and
whether the claimant selected damages or restitution, the award leads one
to come to the conclusion that in situations where a host state is willing
to live up to its obligations specifically and the circumstance of the case
ensure the claimant that the host state will be able to meet its obligation
in kind, one must prefer restitution over monetary compensation. This
will likely "wipe out" all consequences of a breach by the host state and
would restore claimant to the position he would have been in without any
violation of the BIT. Furthermore, in situations where a host state itself
is willing to perform its obligations in kind, there does not seem to be any
306. Id. ¶ 569.
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enforcement problem based on sovereignty. Accordingly, the arguments
of those who attack specific performance because of difficulty in its
enforcement become automatically irrelevant. The interesting point with
regard to the award is the way the tribunal has framed the remedy which
guides us to deduct the possibility of change of remedy.
The award first obligates the respondent to make proposals to the
claimant for the restitution of the investment in the airport store within a
period of no more than sixty days from the date of the award. It then
authorizes the claimant to accept or reject the proposed form of restitution
at any time within a period of ninety days from the date of the award. One
may make different assumptions based on these two parts of the award:
(a) the respondent makes the proposed way of restitution before the
expiration of the sixty-day period. The claimant rejects it before the
expiration of the ninety-day period since it does not assure him that the
respondent will be able to make the restitution; (b) the respondent makes
the proposed way of restitution shortly before or at the final day of
deadline. The claimant rejects the proposed way of restitution and opts
for damages claim; (c) the respondent fails to make the proposed way of
restitution within the allowed time period. In such a situation, the award
provides that it shall pay damages of MDL 35,136,294; (d) the respondent
proposes an appropriate way of restitution and the claimant decides to
accept it. Unfortunately, the award does not expressly state whether the
decision of the claimant within the allowed time to reject or accept the
proposed way of restitution is conclusive or changeable. The appearance
of the ward as well as inability of the tribunal to supervise the restitution
indicates that the decision to reject or accept the restitution is definitive.
Therefore, if the respondent makes the proposal on the thirtieth of the
deadline and the claimant rejects it right away; the claimant shall not have
an opportunity to change his mind subsequently even if the respondent
proposes a way that totally assures the claimant of the restitution.
However, if one reads the award from a functional perspective, one may
come to the conclusion that the claimant should be able to change his
mind at least during the permissible period of time which might be
particularly useful in the assumptions "a" and "d." Take the assumption
of "d" as an example in which the respondent proposes an appropriate
way of restitution and the claimant decides to accept it. However, the
respondent later declares that it is unwilling to make the promised
restitution. Should the claimant be left without remedy? The answer is
that the principle of good faith and full compensation shall obligate the
respondent to pay damages and thus the claimant should be able to shift
from specific performance to a damages claim. Likewise, if according to
assumption (a) the main reason for the rejection of restitution was the lack
of solid guarantee on the part of the respondent, why one cannot accept
the possibility of change of remedy if the respondent subsequently
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provides a secure guarantee in accordance with the requirements
satisfactory to the claimant. These claims are made regardless of the fact
that there would be some practical hindrance given that at the time the
claimant decides to shift from the first resorted remedy to another
remedy, the tribunal would have not been in place. However, these are
procedural dilemmas that need to be handled in accordance with the
substantive law necessities.
There are also situations where a shift from damages to specific
performance may become necessary. This might take place in various
stages of the proceeding. For example, as studies demonstrate, there are
certainly situations where the calculation of damages may prove to be
very difficult or impossible such as where compensation is grounded in
lost profits. Furthermore, as some scholars have pointed out the amount
of damages payable in favor of investors in investor-state dispute
settlement has begun "to become notorious resulting in big money award
against relatively poor nations."311 This might lead to the inability of poor
countries to pay damages. It is clear that in such situations investors
should not be left without a remedy. The principle of full compensation
and the principle of good faith should give the opportunity to an
aggrieved investor to shift from the first resorted remedy, in our
assumption damages, to specific performance and vice versa. Schwebel
argues "if a state, as is sometimes the case, lacks the capacity to pay the
damages it would be obliged to pay were monetary compensation
required, it may be said that good faith requires the contract to be
performed specifically."312 This inability to pay damages or impossibility
to calculate recoverable damages may become manifest during the
proceeding or after the tribunal renders its award. In either case the
investor must be able to change his remedy.
As we addressed under the PICC and other relevant international and
regional instruments, the accumulation and change of remedy aspect of
the principle of full compensation does not, on its face, strengthen an
aggrieved party's right to specific performance since in these cases the
aggrieved party has already obtained an order for specific performance.
However, taking into account the fact that it makes specific performance
a flexible remedy capable of making whole the losses arising from a
311. McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 226, at 341 (arguing that "as investment arbitration
begins to become notorious for their potential to result in big money award against relatively poor
nations, it may be time to rethink this position. They goes further and point out tribunals should
be willing to consider preliminary orders to lift discriminatory treatments or to seek other
administrative remedies that can provide full satisfaction to investors before moving to award
compensation"); Aaken, supra note 10, at 749 (arguing that "the amount of damages awarded in
some cases can be equally sovereignty infringing").
312. Stephen M. Schwebel, Speculations on Specific Performance ofa Contract Between a
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breach of an obligation, it could be seen a solid foundation for the
existence of specific performance in ISDS. On the other hand, the need
for a shift from a damages claim to specific performance seems to be
particularly useful in ISDS and provides a sound theoretical foundation
for the existence of specific performance in the context of ISDS.
CONCLUSION
Arbitral tribunals rarely grant specific performance in ISDS. The
apparent infringement a state's sovereignty, the difficulty of enforcement
of non-pecuniary remedies, and the fact that investors almost always
frame their claims in terms of monetary damages are among the most
significant reasons that explain the scarcity of specific performance in
ISDS.
The main thesis of this Article is to argue that arbitral tribunals should
be able to grant specific performance if requested by an aggrieved party.
We tried to substantiate our claim relying on the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and doctrines of "accumulation of remedies" and "change of
remedy" as two crucial aspects of the principle of full compensation.
These foundations proved that the arguments put forwarded against non-
pecuniary remedies in ISDS are ill founded and incomplete since there
are certainly situations in which specific performance might prove to be
inevitable and desirable. Also, as the examination of the PICC showed,
the primary effect of the principle of the pacta sunt servanda is an
aggrieved party's right to choose specific performance. We established
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda lies also at the heart of
international public law as well as international investment law and
therefore it should be taken as seriously as it is taken in the context of
contract law. The investigation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda
also clarified that non-pecuniary remedies are not incompatible with
states' sovereignty since sovereignty does not exists in vacuum and the
right and power to enter into contracts and make treaties is an obvious
attribute of sovereignty. Specific performance as a primary effect of the
principle of pacta sunt servada is in accordance with parties'
expectations. It also creates predictability and stability which in turn may
give rise to the attraction of more investment. The paper illuminated that
specific performance is in accord with the nature of long-term contracts
and investment treaties. We showed that in some sector, states themselves
attach huge significance to this factor.
Having identified circumstances under which specific performance
may be necessary and desirable, we proposed to mechanisms namely
doctrines of "change of remedy" and "accumulation of remedies" to
accomplish the goal of full compensation through the remedy of specific
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performance.
We pointed out that accumulation aspect of the principle of full
compensation, on its face, does not provide a sound foundation for the
existence of non-pecuniary remedies in ISDS since it presumes that the
aggrieved party has already obtained an order for specific performance.
However, considering that it makes specific performance a flexible
remedy capable of making whole all of the losses arising from a breach
of an obligation, it could be perceived as a solid foundation for the
existence of specific performance in ISDS.
When it comes to change of remedy aspect of the principle of full
compensation, we provided illustrations of the circumstances under
which it would be desirable and sometime indispensable to allow an
aggrieved party to shift from damages claim to specific performance and
vice versa. For instance, as the case of Arif showed where there is high
chance of continuation of a friendly relationship between an investor and
a host state itself is keen to meet its obligations specifically and the
circumstances of the case also shows that the claimant is also interested
in specific performance, it would certainly be desirable to opt for specific
performance than damages claim. This would have many implications: it
will highly likely wipe out all consequences of a wrongful act by the host
state; it will, to a great extent, guarantee a friendly continuation of the
relationship between the investor and the host state which in turn will
bring more development into the host state and thus creates a balance
between the interests of the investor and the host state. It is clear that
these circumstances may arise in different phases of the proceeding (e.g.,
after the claimant has framed his request for remedy in terms of monetary
compensations and even when the tribunal has rendered his final award
in favor of damages claim). In either case, the aggrieved party should be
able to change his remedy from damages claim to specific performance.
There are, of course, procedural problems inherent in change of remedy.
For example, when the aggrieved party decides to change his remedy in
favor of specific performance, the arbitral tribunal may not be in place.
However, the procedural problems cannot undermine the existence and
desirability of substantive rights. The procedurals problems ought to be
handled in accordance with the substantive law necessities.
Moreover, the change of remedy aspect of the principle of full
compensation revealed that in some circumstances an aggrieved party
should be able to shift from damages claim to specific performance. This
may be particularly relevant in ISDS since e.g., a host state may not be
able to pay the amount of awarded damages or because of the long-term
nature of investment it becomes impossible to quantify damages. The
principle of full compensation and the principle of good faith are crucial
grounds that may justify such a shift from damages claim to specific
performance and ILC Articles provide legal authority for change of
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remedy in international law as well as international investment law. As a
result, the arbitral tribunals must take non-pecuniary remedies including
specific performance very seriously in ISDS since the soundness of a
legal regime depends in large part on the one hand devising appropriate
remedies or mechanisms to encounter any breach of an obligation and on
other hand strong devises for the enforcement of the available remedies.
Therefore, in order to enhance the soundness of investment law regime,
the paper proposes that full-on prohibitions of the remedy of specific
performance should not be written into the texts of future investment
treaties nor read into the texts of the many existing treaties that are silent
with regard to the types of available remedies.
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